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Abstract 
Bidding and bundling profitable goods for multiple clients from online auctions is a 
complicated task. First, goods are sold under various mechanisms like English or 
sealed-bid auction simultaneously. An agent has to handle multiple trading 
mechanisms (auction protocols) concurrently. Second, client preferences are over 
bundles. An agent has to consider interacting relation of goods inside the bundles. 
Third, an agent has to allocate goods to multiple clients in the most profitable way. 
Several goods inside a bundle are not currently held but can be acquired later. The 
agent faces a complicated allocation problem which involves both held and to be 
acquired goods items. Moreover, an agent faces a game playing problem as 
opponent's strategies are unknown. 
This thesis proposes a general agent model to bid and bundle goods for multiple 
clients from online auctions. The agent model decomposes the whole problem into 
several sub-problems, which can be handled by a set of mechanisms. The mechanisms 
include referencing historical clearing prices, increasing marginal costs for uncertain 
goods, bidding uncertain goods at low prices and considering bid winning 
probabilities. This thesis also studies interactions between agents with binary decision: 
being aggressive or adaptive. The results show that the minority has an advantage in a 
market under binary decision. For example, aggressive agents perform better when 
there are too many adaptive agents. 
i 
In Trading Agent Competition (TAG ’02)，we implemented an agent called "CUHK" 
to participate in the tournament and it was one of the finalists. The agent was derived 
from our agent model. This thesis presents the results obtained from both TAG '02 
competition and our controlled environment. The TAC '02 competition result 
indicates that our agent model performs well even compared to world-leading 
research groups. The results from controlled environment show that our agent 
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Online auction: An auction takes place in an electronic market, in 
which clients are participating via communicating 
channels such as the Internet 
Online bidding agent: A "software robot" assists its client(s) to 
participate in online auction(s). It is capable of 
autonomous actions including bidding, pricing or 
monitoring online auctions 
Goods: Objects traded in online auctions 
Item: A single unit of goods 
BED: The current bid quote. In general, it refers to the 
highest bid among all participants at current time 
ASK: The current asked quote. In general, it refers to the 
lowest ask among all participants at current time 
Clearing price: The trading price of an item when BID matches 
ASK 
Single-sided auction: An auction where participants are either buyer or 
seller, but not both at the same time 
Double-sided auction: An auction where a participant may be both buyer 
and seller at the same time 
Marginal cost: Increase in total cost for an additional goods item 
Sunk cost: Cost spent, that is not related to future decisions 
Opportunity cost: The highest valued option foregone for a decision 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A search for online auction houses in Google^ will probably return more than a 
thousand links. Online auctions become so popular since they can generate a huge 
amount of profit for auction houses. The total revenue generated by online auctions 
was about USD 8.4 billion in 2001 and predicted to reach USD 48.5 billion in 2006 
(Surmacz, 2001). The increasing popularity of Internet brought numerous customers 
from worldwide to participate in online auctions. Besides, online auctions can also 
operate with existence of autonomous online agents, which is a kind of "software 
robot" to assist clients in bidding goods and monitoring auctions. 
Unlike traditional auctions, participants in online auctions are from everywhere and 
are invisible to each others. More interestingly, participants do not always have good 
auction knowledge and bidding skills. They can aggressively bid their desired goods 
at high bidding prices. Alternatively, other participants may always respond to market 
changes and decide what the best bids are. Various participant combinations can lead 
to many possible outcomes. An online bidding agent faces a game playing problem 
since opponents' strategies are unknown. 
The trading mechanism of an auction is called auction protocol. In online auctions, 
the most commonly used auction protocols include: English, Dutch, Vickery (Vickery, 
1961), first-sealed bid and second-sealed bid auctions. Simultaneous auctions or 
‘www.google.com 
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parallel auctions refer to various auctions running at the same time. An agent faces a 
multiple auction protocols problem when it participates in simultaneous auctions 
using various auction protocols. 
A bundle refers to a combination of goods. For example, a desktop computer is a 
bundle while CPU, RAM and hard disk are its components. An agent may have a 
client whose preference is over bundles. The agent faces a bundle completion problem 
when component goods are traded in various auctions. Goods inside a bundle are 
interacting, either complementary or substitutable (GreenwaJd & Boyan, 2001b). Let 
u(G) be a function which maps a type of goods G to an utility value. Complementary 
goods are goods with super-additive value, uiAB) + U(AB) < u{AB). Substitutable 
goods are goods with sub-additive value, u{AB) + u{AB) > u(AB). An agent has to 
decide the most profitable bundle for its client. At a particular time, the agent holds 
several components goods but not all of them. Since clearing prices of several goods 
are unknown, there is uncertainty in completing the bundles. 
An allocation describes how an agent distributes goods to multiple clients. Each client 
has his/her private values on bundles. Allocating same goods to one client may 
generate more profit than allocating that to another client. The agent faces an 
allocation problem if it serves more than one client. At a particular time, several 
component goods are not currently held but could be acquired later. One possible 
reason is that corresponding auctions are still running. The allocating problem in 
simultaneous auctions is complicated because it involves both held and not held 
goods. 
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1.2 Testing Environment 
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) is chosen as our testing environment^. The 
(TAC) has been organized since 2000 which aims at providing a realistic and 
multifaceted benchmarking problem in e-market, with simple rules and interfaces 
(Wellman el al.，2001). In simple words, a TAC agent is going to construct travel 
packages for multiple clients. A travel package is a bundle of substitutable or 
complementary goods, which are traded in simultaneous auctions using various 
auction protocols. A TAC agent communicates to the TAC server via TCP/IP, 
obtaining marking information and submitting bids. As clearing prices of several 
goods are unknown, the most profitable travel packages are not determined until all 
auctions close. A TAC agent should be able to reason under a degree of uncertainty. 
The key challenges in TAC include clearing price prediction, value assessment of 
goods, allocation of goods, strategically bidding, risk management, machine learning 
and game playing. In TAC，02，we implemented an agent called "CUHK" to 
participate in the tournament. Although the agent made mistakes in the final round, it 
ranked the over 19 teams from world-leading research groups. The agent would 
rank position if no mistakes were made. 
1.2.1 Game Overview 
The whole TAC game consists of many TAC game instances. Each game instance 
lasts for 12 minutes and involves 8 trading agents. In a game instance, each TAC 
agent represents 8 clients who are planning to travel Tampa from TAC town within a 
national 5 day period (day 1-5). As a result, there are altogether 64 clients in a game 
2 For full detail, see http://www.sics.se (TAC，02) and http://auction2.eecs.umich.edu (TAC ’01) 
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instance. A travel package is a bundle consists of inbound and outbound return flight 
tickets, hotel room reservations and entertainment tickets. The trip duration should be 
at least one day. No hotel reservation and entertainment event is needed on return day. 
Consequently, there is no outbound ticket at day 1，no inbound ticket at day 5，no 
hotel reservation at day 5 and no entertainment ticket at day 5. The flight tickets, hotel 
room reservations and entertainment tickets are traded using 3 different market 
mechanisms. 
Outbound flights only 
available for day: 2-5 
Inbound flights only | No hotel reservation or 
available for day 1-4 ；^；；^"^  ‘ ^^^^^^ entertainment tickets 
at day 5 
‘ • Day 
1 2 3 4 5 
Figure 1: The TAC world 
1.2.2 Auctions 
• Flights: TACAir is the only airline providing flight tickets between TAC and 
Tampa. There are altogether eight markets for flight tickets, one market each 
direction per day (INI, IN2... 0UT5). All markets close at the end of a game 
instance. The market mechanism used is "take-it or leave-it" and flight tickets 
supply is unlimited. Tickets are traded simultaneously during a game instance. 
The trading agent acquires flight tickets by providing bids to TACAir. 
Transaction clears immediately once a bid is higher than the current flight ticket 
price, ASK. Otherwise, the bid is carried forward to the next round. The market 
5 
can be considered as a special kind of "auction". The flight prices in each market 
are independent, having initial values between 250 and 400. The flight prices 
change by A every 24-32 seconds, where A is a random variable drawn from -10 
to 90. In general, A follows a random walk but has an increasing trend. Resale of 
flight ticket is not allowed in TAC. 
參 Hotels: Two hotels are available in Tampa: Tampa Tower (XT) and Shoreline 
Shanties (SS). TT is a better hotel as it has a cleaner, more comfortable and more 
convenient environment. All clients prefer to stay in TT than SS for the same 
n 
cost. Room reservations are sold at multi-unit simultaneous ascending auctions . 
There are altogether eight auctions for hotel reservations, one auction each hotel 
per day (SSI, TT1...TT4). Each trading agent submits bids with its target 
quantity of goods. Transactions clear once at the end of an auction. The top 16 
bids win the 16 room reservations at the highest bidding price. In TAC game 
setting, one random auction for hotel reservations will be selected to close per 
minute since the end of minute. All auctions for hotel reservations closed 
before the last minute (the minute). The TAC server provides updated ASK 
and BID quotes to trading agents only once per minute. The ASK is the current 
16th highest bidding price while BID is the current 17出 highest bidding price. 
Other information such as higher bids is unknown for trading agents. A valid bid 
should satisfy 2 conditions: (i) offers to buy at least one unit at a price of ASK+1 
or greater and (ii) offers buying quantity equals to or more than HQW (the 
agent's winning quantity if the auction closes now). Withdrawal of hotel bids and 
resale of hotel reservations are not allowed in TAC. 
3 The auction for hotel auctions is described as "standard English ascending multi-unit" in TAC '02 
official page. 
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參 Entertainments: There are 3 different kinds of entertainment events: Alligator 
wrestling (AW), Amusement park (AP) and Museum (MU). There are altogether 
12 auctions for entertainment tickets, one each kind per day (AWl, AP1...MU4). 
The market mechanism used is continuous double auction (CDA). All 12 
auctions close at the end of a game instance. Each trading agent has 12 tickets 
randomly assigned at the beginning of a game instance. The agents trade their 
entertainment tickets by providing bid and ask. Transactions clear immediately 
when one bid is over another ask. Unmatched bids become standing bids and are 
carried to the next round. The TAG server provides updated ASK and BID quotes 
simultaneously. The ASK is the current lowest ask and BID is the current highest 
bid. Both withdrawal of bids and resale of tickets are allowed. The market is 
much like a "stock market". 
A random hotel auction is randomly selected to 
close per minute in this interval 
Beginning of a TAC ^ ^ 
game instance 
V I I ^ 
5 4 ^ ^ Minute 
A 
Auctions for flight tickets and 
entertainment tickets close at the 
end of a TAC game instance. 
Figure 2: The timeline of a TAC game instance 
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1.2.3 Utility and Scores 
In TAG, a travel package is described as feasible if it contains (i) an inbound ticket, (ii) 
an outbound return ticket and (iii) room reservations in same hotel within the whole 
tour. 
Each client has his/her (i) preferred arrival (day 1-4) and return date (day 2-5)，(ii) 
reward to stay in better hotel TT (50-150) and (iii) rewards to enjoy various 
entertainment events (0-200 each). Those clients' preferences are randomly generated 
and vary from client to client. (See table below for an example) 
Table 1: The client preferences of our CUHK agent in game 452 at tac4.sisc.se.'' 
Client PAD PDD I HV AWV APV MUV 
•— 一 � .… ....... _ j \ I_ 
i 1 I Day 1 ; Day 2 ; 76 I 65 129 ； 170」 
2 Day 2 Day 4 119 9 : 168 43 
3 」 D a y 3 Day 4 丨 121 26 68 ： 97 
4 」 D a y 3 Day 5 ^ 117 \ 54 160 : 97 J 
5 ' Day 2 丨 Day 3 50 35 49 丨 102 
I ..... M-.1 .r i 'li.v., r-..,』vv.〜.jl,.u,.,ni, } 
I 6 Day 3 ' Day 4 」 1 0 9 」 6 9 、 166 ‘ 182 
7 Day 3 ‘ Day 5 」 1 2 1 ‘ 104 J 93 〗 1 3 9 」 
8 1 Day 2 ) Day 3 | ~ 5 1 丨 75 72 0 ： 
--ww^W ^ - "II i ^ -；-：-； 
I PAD and PDD stand for preferred arrival and departure date. HV stands for rewards to stay in better 
hotel. AWV, APV and MUV stand for the rewards to enjoy entertainment events AW, AP and MU 
respectively. 
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The client utility function, which measured in dollars, is defined as: 
Utility = 1000 - travel penalty + hotel bonus + fun bonus 
where 
travel penalty = 100 * (\AA - PAD\ + \AD - PDD\f 
hotel bonus = the client's reward to stay in hotel TT 
fun bonus = sum of rewards from all entertainment events 
If the client's allocated travel package is not at his/her preferred dates, there is a 
penalty of 100 per day. The client's hotel bonus is per travel package, not per night. 
For each client, duplicated tickets of same event counted once only within a trip. 
There should be no more than one event per night in a travel package. The client 
utility is zero if no feasible travel package is allocated to him/her. The score of a 
trading agent is the sum of all clients' utilities minus total expenditure (See Table 2 for 
an example). 
Table 2: The result of the CUHK agent for game 452 at tac4.sics.se. 
Client AD DD Hotel Entertainment Utility Cost Score | 
1 Day 1 Day 2 TT : API 1205 520.90 丨 684.09 J 
2 Day 2 Day 3 T T 」 AP2 ^ 1187^^ ^^  920.07 | 266.92^ 
3 Day 3 Day 4; TT : MU3 1218 802.61」415.38 | 
4 Day 4 D a y ^ TT AP4 1177 : 756.51 ’ 420.48 
5 Day 2 Day^' SS MU2 」 1 1 0 2 ‘ 895.35 206.64 
6 Day 3 Day 4 TT MU3 ‘ 1291 J 802.61」488.38 J 
7 I Day 31| Day 5 丨 TT ： AW3, MU4 1364 630.21 733.78 ‘ 
8 Day 2 Day 3 SS 丨 AP2 1072 ； 806.60 : 265.39 
Sum 9616 丨 6134.88 : 3481.11 ‘ 
： i 
Other costs (unused goods, transaction losses, etc) j 48.77」 J 
Total 9616 ‘ 6183.66 . 3432.34 ^  
5 The AD and DD stand for the actual arrival date and return date in allocated travel package 
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Further details of market game could be found at the TAG pages.^ There is a multiple 
auction protocols problem because flight tickets, hotel reservations and entertainment 
tickets are traded under various auction protocols. There is a bundle completion 
problem because all goods are interacting. Flight tickets and hotel reservations are 
complementary because they are essential components for a feasible travel package. 
Entertainment tickets at the same day are substitutable goods because reward is 
counted once only. There is allocation problem because each TAC agent serves eight 
clients whose preferences are private. In TAC, each agent needs to compete with 
seven unknown opponents. Therefore, a TAC agent faces a game playing problem 
because opponents' strategies are unknown. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution and Organization 
This thesis studies how an online bidding agent can effectively serve multiple clients, 
where bidding goods under various auction protocols and bundling goods items to 
profitable bundles are necessities. The problem we study in this thesis involves 
features of all multiple auction protocols problem, bundle completion problem, 
allocation problem and game playing problem. In this thesis, we proposed a generic 
agent model using a divide-and-conquer approach to tackle the whole problem. The 
divided sub-problems then can be handled by a set of mechanisms proposed by us. 
This thesis also studied the agent's interactions in binary decision case. The 
experimental results show that the minority has an advantage in a market. 
6 http://tac.eecs.umich.edu (TAC，01) and http://www.sics.se/tac (TAC，02) 
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 discusses previous 
research in related areas. Chapter 3 describes a theoretical model for agents in online 
auctions. Chapter 4 introduces our agent architecture and explains the mechanisms in 
each component. Chapter 5 presents the TAC '02 competition results and evaluates 
our design with empirical data under controlled environment. Chapter 6 concludes the 
thesis and possible explores future research. 
11 
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Chapter 2 - Related Work 
2.1 Traditional auction theory 
The study of autonomous bidding agent was few until online auctions have become 
popular. Although there were a number of literatures in the traditional auction theory 
(Kleinperer, 1999), they focused on auctions that trade only one unit of goods with a 
preset auction protocol. Past traditional auctions were held in physical locations and 
required bidders to participate in person. As a result of geographical and time 
limitations, bidders did not participate in multiple auctions simultaneously. There was 
no bundle completion problem or multiple auction protocols problem (see Chapter 1). 
Online auctions revolutionize the auction style because they allow bidders to 
participate in multiple auctions running simultaneously. 
Some assumptions in traditional auction theory do not hold in online auctions (Bapna 
e( al., 2001). First, the risk attributes of a participant cannot be assumed as neutral. 
Second, a participant's valuation is not as simple as an independent random variable 
from a given distribution. The effect of external auctions should be considered, 
especially when goods are interacting (complementary or substitutable). Thus, 
bidding strategies in traditional auction theory are not fully applicable to online 
auctions. 
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2.2 Technologies related to online auctions 
Auction sites sometimes provide simple bidding agents for their clients. For example, 
the Proxy Bidding in eBay.com is a simple bidding agent which keeps increasing the 
bid just over the current price. Then, it stops increasing the bid once the current price 
is over the customer's pre-defined valuation. Alternatively, another agent may keep 
waiting and then bid over the current price just before an auction closes. Those simple 
bidding agents work only for single item, for single auction protocol and within their 
auction sites. The key advantage is their autonomy in bidding and monitoring auctions. 
In other words, simple bidding agents cannot be used for multiple auction protocols 
problem or bundle completion problem. 
To assist customers bidding in online auctions, some technologies were developed in 
recent years. The auction search engines are designed for collecting and comparing 
prices from online product or service providers. In simultaneous auctions, price 
monitoring is time-consuming. Given customer's target goods, auction search engines 
return a list of open auctions with their current prices, remaining time and auction 
protocols^. Customers can compare prices easily and save time from finding auctions 
of desired goods. Yet, auction search engines do not assist customers in bidding and 
allocating goods. The customers have to analyze collected prices and make decisions 
by themselves; or they can ask another agent to analyze for them. Pricebots is another 
technology specific for selling goods online. Pricebots are autonomous selling agents, 
which are designed to maximize selling profit using various price-setting methods 
(Greenwald & Kephart, 1999). Auction search engines and pricebots partially solve 
the multiple auction protocols problem because they represent price information of 
7 ww.bidxs.com，www.bidfmd.com 
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various auction protocols in a universal format. 
2.3 Recent researches on online auctions 
Some previous researches concentrated on bidding a single item from simultaneous 
auctions using various auction protocols (Anthony el al., 2001; llo et al., 2000). As 
those researches concentrated on bidding a single item, there is no complementary 
relationship among various goods. Those researches solved only the multiple auction 
protocols problem, but not the bundle completion problem and allocation problem. 
Recently, there have been an increasing number of researches about bidding and 
bundling interacting goods from simultaneous auctions using various auction 
Q 
protocols. TAC is a typical example. Over past TAC tournaments, the organizations 
were successful to motivate researchers working on a common problem. A lot of 
studies done by the researchers were published. One example is the fantastic 
“priceline” structure which was investigated by RoxyBot team in TAC '00 
(Greenwald and Boyan, 2001a). 
8 TAC '00 and TAC '01 were organized by University of Michigan; while TAC '02 was organized by 
SICS. 
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The priceline data structure is the core part of Roxybot design. The major advantage 
of priceline is its flexibility. The priceline represents marginal costs) of items in a 
universal format for both single-sided and double-sided auctions, and both limited and 
unlimited supply/demand. The marginal costs are represented as real numbers. The 
priceline is a very useful structure for the problem we study in this thesis. First, it 
solves multiple auction protocols problem because it uses a universal representation 
for all auction protocols. Second, it reduces the complexity of bundle completion 
problem and allocation problem because an agent only need to reason under a set of 
real numbers. On the other hand, the priceline works with known clearing prices only. 
An additional prediction mechanism is needed when clearing prices are unknown. 
Another example is the study of efficient allocation mechanisms for multiple clients. 
The top two agents in TAC '00 investigated how to adopt heuristic search and linear 
programming (LP) to resolve the resources allocation problem (Greenwald & Boyan, 
2001b; Stone at el., 2001). Those two methods have been widely used and further 
improved by researchers in later TAC t o u r n a m e n t s T h e performances of those 
allocation strategies are both heavily depends on accurate price prediction. 
Although there is no dominant strategy in TAC problem; meaningful works have been 
done by researchers to tackle multiple auction protocols problem, bundle completion 
problem and allocation problem. The participants in TAC '00 aimed at developing an 
efficient algorithm to resolve the NP-complete^' allocation problem. In TAC，01，the 
main focus was switched to cost prediction because the game rules changed. The 
9 The marginal cost of an item refers the amount we will pay for using that item in an allocation. 
10 Examples included ATTac, TACSMAN, PainlnNEC, Southampton (TAC，01)，PackaTAC and 
Walverine (TAC ’02). 
‘1 NP-complete problem cannot be solved in a polynomial time. 
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auctions for hotel reservations became uncertain because they close in random order 
and their ASK/BID quotes were updated only once per minute. In TAC '02, there was 
no specialized focusing area. The research area was extended to include machine 
learning, multi-agent system, game playing, observable Markov decision process and 
much more. The previous TAC reports summarized and compared agents' strategies in 
TAC '00 (Stone & Greenwald, 2000), TAC '01 (Wellman, Greenwald, Stone & 
Wurman, 2002) and TAC '02 (Greenwald, 2002). 
2.3.1 Priceline (proposed by Amy Greenwald) 
For each goods g, there is one priceline p^. The priceline p^ is a vector < pgj，pg2， 
p ,^.?, "••> where pg„ is marginal cost of the n'^ item. First, we assume all held items of 
goods gi are not allowed for resale. Suppose an agent currently holds 3 items of goods 
gi and it wants 2 more items. Based on a given prediction mechanism, the clearing 
price for two additional items are predicted to be 10 and 20. In this case, the priceline 
for gi is given by p =<0’ 0，0，10’ 20’ oo, oo, oo...>. The first three entries are zero 
S 1 
because they are sunk cost. Sunk cost refers to the cost we already paid for 
non-reusable goods. The first three items can be allocated without any cost. For the 4�& 
and 5th items, their entries equal the predicted prices because the agent needs to 
acquire them from others. The subsequent infinity entries indicate that those items are 
not useful for the agent. 
Now we relax the constraint in resale such that an agent is allowed to resell all held 
items. Suppose other agents are willing to buy two items of gi with prices 2 and 5. 
Then, the priceline of gi become p„ =<0，2，5’ 10，20，00, 00, 00...>. It is because the 
衫1 
2nd and 3rd items have opportunity costs now. Opportunity cost of an item refers to the 
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value of that item in another highest-value alternative. If an agent does not allocate 
those items, it can gain extra utility by reselling them to other agents. 
2.3.2 ATTac: Integer Linear Programming (ILP) 
We summarize the ILP employed by ATTac in TAC '00. Here we describe the original 
version. There were other modified versions in later TAC tournaments. 
Definitions 
c: A client symbol, from 1 to 8 
f: A feasible travel package symbol, with 
• AD(f): arrival day, from 1 to 4 
• DD(f): departure day, from 2 to 5 
• H(f)： the hotel, either TT or SS 
e: An entertainment ticket, with 
• T(e): type of event, either AW or AP or MU 
• D(e): day of the event, from 1 to 4 
r: A resource, either IN or OUT or TT or SS 
P(c,f): An indicator whether client c is allocated with feasible travel package f, 
altogether 160 variables 
E(c,e): An indicator whether client c is allocated with entertainment ticket e, 
altogether 96 variables 
Br(d): The target buying quantity of resource r on day d 
Or(d): The current holding quantity of resources r 
Pr(d): The current price (asked) of resources r 
up(c,f): The utility gained by allocating client c with feasible travel package f 
UE(c’e): The utility gained by allocating client c with entertainment ticket e 
Objective function 
f)P(c, + e)E(c, e)- ^ Pout WBout ⑷ - J^PR 跳 ( d ) 
c j c’e </e{2,3,4,5} rfe{2,3,4,5),rG{/A/,7T,55} 
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The first term indicates the total utility gained from allocated feasible travel packages. 
The second term indicates the total utility gained from allocated entertainment tickets. 
The third term indicates the cost for acquiring additional outbound tickets. The fourth 
term indicates the cost for acquiring additional inbound tickets and hotel reservations. 
Constraints 
1. Vc, < 1, no more than one travel package should be allocated to 
one client. 
2. V^/6 {1,2,3,4},]^ Z/^(c，/)So,"(cO + 5,"(cO ’ the number of inbound 
C f\AD{f)=d 
flight tickets should be sufficient for the allocation. 
3. V J e {2,3,4,5},^ ^ P ( c , / ) < Oqut (^) + ^out (^ ) ‘ the number of outbound 
C /lDD(/)=d 
flight tickets should be sufficient for the allocation. 
4. Vc/E {1,2,3,4} anc/he{SS,7T},J^ J^P(c,f)<o,(d) + B,(d) , the 
c /|«(/)=/i AND AD{f)<d<DD{f) 
number of hotel reservations should be sufficient for the allocation. 
5. \/e, < o^(e)，the entertainment tickets allocated should be held by 
the agent. 
6. VcVe, ^ P ( c , f ) , entertainment tickets should be within the 
AD{f)<D(e)<DD{f) 
travel package tour. 
7. Vc and d e {1,2,3,4}, - ^ ‘ no more than one entertainment 
ticket should be allocated to a client at the same day 
8. Vc and te {AP,AW,MU], Y 阶,�E(c,e) < 1，duplicate tickets of the same 
entertainment event should not be allocated to a client 
9. The variables should be integers. 
There are altogether 188 constraints. The ATTac could resolve the optimal allocation 
within 1 second using a software package "LPsolve" with a 650MHz Pentium 
machine. 
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2.3.3 RoxyBot: Beam search 
The Beam search is an approximate approach. The search processes from level to 
level. 12 In each level, scores of all nodes are calculated based on a given heuristic 
function f(x). Only the best N nodes are selected to expand in each level. The 
parameter N is called “beam width". The whole process is without backtracking. The 
Roxybot divides a search into two stages: 1) travel package feasibility and 2) fun 
bonus. In each stage, the feasible travel packages (or entertainment tickets) are 
1 
allocated to clients one by one. The search depth of each stage is 8. Therefore, the 
total depth of two stages is 16 and the number of nodes is bounded by 16iV. 
力 ^ ^ ^ 个 
Level 1 O ... O ... O 
““‘ feasible travel packages, depth =8 
Z/ 
Level 8 O ... O ... O f 
^ ^ • 
〇 . . . 〇 . . . 〇 “ 
.,. entertainment tickets, depth =8 
z/ ^ ^ ^ 
〇 . . . 〇 . . . 〇 1 r A • 
beam width = N 
Figure 3: The Roxybot's beam search tree (TAC，00) 
12 A level refers to the order of generation in a search tree. The children of the starting node are in level 
one. The children generated by the level one node are in level two. 
13 Search depth refers to the number of levels. 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical model for 
agents in online auctions 
This chapter describes a theoretical model for agents in online auctions. First, we 
introduce a high-level planning for trading agents. Then, we formulate the bundle 
completion problem for multiple clients under various auction protocols into a 
mathematical model (as well as TAC problem). 
3.1 High-level planning 
Although each trading agent has its own mechanism; most of them adopt a general 
high-level planning (Wei I man, Greenwald, Stone & Wurman, 2002). The high-level 
planning of an agent can be modeled as working cycles with different cycle times. For 
example, "SouthamptonTAC" reviewed its allocation adaptively for each game 
instance in TAC '01. It had cycle times between 6 and 30 seconds, based on the time 
used for communicating with TAC server (He & Jennings, 2002). Another agent, 
"livingagents", never changed its strategy and bid all desired items only once per 
game instance in TAC ‘01 (Fritschi & Dorer, 2002). In another view, "livingagents" 
took the whole game instance as one cycle and performed all tasks within that cycle. 
This high level planning is able to model both adaptive and non-adaptive trading 
agents. As the model is general, we believe it is also applicable to other market 
scenarios. The overview of the high-level planning is given in the table below. 
2 0 
Table 3: An agent's high-level planning - cycle 
High-level plannine 
1 Gather market information from online auctions 
2 Estimate marginal cost of each single item 
3 Estimate the most profitable target, T 
4 Generate a target list of items based on T 
5 Bid the items in target list using different bidding strategies 
In TAC，02，our developed agent "CUHK" adopted working cycles of one minute 
because the ASK/BED quotes of hotel rooms were updated once per minute. The 
uncertainty of hotel rooms is the highest among all goods in TAC scenario due to 
random auction closing times, in addition to fluctuating. To be an adaptive trading 
agent in TAC, the planning should be reviewed at least once per minute. The CUHK 
agent decided to review its planning only once per minute to avoid changing 
allocation too frequent and becoming over-reactive. 
3.2 Mathematical model 
Greenwald and Boyan (Greenwald and Boyan, 2001b) formulated a model that deals 
with static prices: 
G: Set of all goods, G = {1,2,...,|G|} • 
q: A bundle, which is in form of vector <q\, qi, qs, q4...q\G\> where qg 
represents the quantity of goods g inside the bundle 
Q: Set of all bundles 
u(q): Utility function of bundle q 
u: Q 
Util(S): The total utility of a subset of bundles 5c (2 , iQ.Util(S) = ^m(^) 
qeS 
21 
Used(S,g): The quantity of goods g in subset SQQ, \.Q.Used{S,g) = 
qBS 
Pg: The priceline" of goods g, which is a vector <pg\, pg2, … � 
where pgn indicates the marginal cost of nth ^^^^ of goods g 
P: Apricelineprofile,尸={A,P2,...’P |g|} 
(B. Set of all priceline profiles 
Used(S,g) 
Cost(S): The total expenditure, i.e. Cost{S) = ^ ^Pgn 
geG n=l 
The bundle completion problem, Completion(P,Q,u), is given by: 
S* = argmax([/n7(5) - Cost(S)) 
SQQ 
In this model, a universal utility function is defined for all bundles. It implies that 
there is a public value for all bundles. In many market scenarios (like TAC), each 
client has his/her private values over bundles. Hence, we revise the above model to 
incorporate 1) multiple clients with private values over bundles and 2) allocation 
goods items to those clients. 
S: An allocation, which is a sequence of bundles 〈夺p 夺2，…’夺|c > 
where ^c is the bundle allocated to client c. 
iq): Utility function of client c, Uc: Q 
ZL： A utility profile for all clients, 11 = ⑷’"2(吞).""|c| (^)} 
Util(S): The total utility of an allocation S, i.Q.Util{S)) = 
i=c 
Used(S,g) Cost(S, P): The total expenditure, i.e. Cost{S, = ^ Pgn 
geG n=l 
14 The priceline described above already combined both buying and selling sides. We have skipped the 
detail in the original paper about how to combine both sides. 
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In the model above, the bundle completion problem and allocation problem become a 
function of static predicted marginal costs (see Chapter 1). The function ignores the 
effects of actions performed by an agent (i.e. bids). Prices are dynamic and keep 
changing even an agent does nothing. Furthermore, a bid submitted by an agent can 
affect both agent's internal state and external market. First, a bid can possibly change 
agent's holding, which is represented as a sunk cost or opportunity cost (see 
Definition) in tho pricolino. Second, a bid submitted by an agent influences the market. 
For example, the bid can possibly induce competitors to increment their bids 
indirectly. Thus, a better model should consider how an agent's bids affect its holding 
and market in a long term. 
Additional Definitions 
bf. A bid (or ask) submitted at cycle i, which is a function : fp — rP 
B: Set of all bids, including no new bid 
Pi： A priceline profile at cycle i, P. E(P 
P^F: Set of all final priceline profiles (i.e. all markets closed), C ^ P 
Suppose all competitors' strategies are known, the effect of a bid on the priceline can 
be determined. 
bo b\ bn 
(Po)——• ( P i ) — — • . . . — — • (PF) 
Figure 4: Effect of a bid on the priceline 
Pp c ！Pp represents a final priceline profile after all markets closed. For a closed 
market, entries in the priceline are either 0 or oo (sunk cost or unavailable). Define b 
as a bid sequence <bo, b\, bi, ... bn> which represents bids submitted by an agent. At 
cycle i, an agent performs different actions (i.e. bids) will result in various final 
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priceline profiles. 
, . / (PP) , . bi / ..…./ bo hi JT 
(Po)——•...——• (Pi) Z 
V..….......•• ( P F ' ) 
Figure 5: Different bids result in various outcomes 
The agent aims at maximizing the final profit. At cycle i, the bundle completion 
problem, Completion(P, Q, 11), is given by: 
[s*，) = arg max m m 一 Cost(S, P,)) 
And, an optimal bid sequence at cycle i is given by: 
K =< ^，〜�—它re h A ” . \ E B and (r�,(“工�[P.)...))= P,* 
The optimal bid sequence is not unique because various bid sequences can lead to a 
single result. Consider an aggressive TAC agent bids all hotel reservations at a high 
bidding price while others are non-competitive agents. Once its bidding price is 
higher than the clearing price, the aggressive agent wins hotel reservations it wants. 
If an agent submits the bid b�in cycle i, will be equal to S:. Otherwise, S^^* 
will become less profitable than S*. The reason is the best allocation S* already 
becomes unobtainable. For example, an agent should acquire four items of goods g to 
obtain the best allocation. However, it won three items only because of a mistaken 
bidding strategy. As the best allocation is already unobtainable, a new (but less 
2 4 
profitable) allocation should be formulated for replacement. The profitability is 
decreasing while allocation keeps changing continuously. 
Util{S；) - CostiS*，P/. *) > UtiKSi:) - Cost{S,,； ’ Pf…*) 
It is hopeless for an agent to determine the optimal bid sequence b * since other 
agent's strategies are unknown. At cycle i, a trading agent can first formulate a target 
Ti whose profit approximates that of S*, i.e. UtiliT^) - Cost{T., P^ *)= 
UtiliS*) - Cost{S*, Pp., *). Afterwards, the agent can follows a bid sequence that 1) 
bids items of goods in target T) and 2) guides S/ (j > i) towards J). 
.、 
(Pi) z \ bi+i / I ... 
A Ti / ^ ^ V L •• t>i+l 
Figure 6: A bid sequence guides the best allocation to our formulated target 
The idea is shown in graphical diagram above. Initially target T) is already close to the 
best allocation S*. The bid sequence continuously guides S/(j > i) towards our target 
Ti. Although we are not able to determine S*, a trading agent has the ability to guide 
Si* to its desired direction. 
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Chapter 4 - Agent Architecture 
and Mechanisms 
This chapter provides all the detail of our proposed agent model. First, we introduce 
the agent architecture which adopts a divide-and-conquer approach. Second, we 
explain how our proposed mechanisms can handle the divided sub-tasks. 
4.1 Architecture 
Our agent model is composed of several components. The 3 key components are Cost 
Estimator (CE), Allocation and Acquisition Solver (AAS) and the Bidders. The figure 




Quotes, • Cost Estimator • Allocation & Acquisition Solver (AAS) 
Status, 
History ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I target list 
The Bidders ； 
Entertainment 
Flight Hotel 
LI I I I I I I. 
bids 
Figure 7: Architecture of our implemented agent, "CUHK" 
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The first component is Cost Estimator (CE). The main responsibility of CE is to 
predict marginal costs (see Definition) of all goods items and feed them into A AS. CE 
uses a data structure called "priceline" to represent estimated marginal costs in a 
common format. Different prediction methods are employed for various auction 
protocols. CE considers both sunk cost and opportunity cost because items can be 
held, possibly won^^ or to be acquired at any time. Another key responsibility of CE 
is to quantify market information such as demand, supply and auction statuses. The 
output of CE is a set of estimated marginal costs. 
The second component is Allocation & Acquisition Solver (AAS). The responsibility 
of AAS is to decide what goods and how many items to buy (or sell). Given client's 
preferences and predicted marginal costs, AAS formulates a target allocation which it 
considers most profitable. As clearing prices of some goods are unknown; the real 
optimal is not well-defined. Thus, the "most profitable allocation" formulated by AAS 
is not the real optimal solution but a function of predicted marginal costs provided by 
CE. The function of marginal costs resolves the bundle completion problem and 
allocation problem altogether. In other words, AAS formulates a direction for an agent 
to follow. The output of AAS is a target list describing how many items of goods to 
buy or sell. 
15 A possibly won item refers to an item which an agent will probably win in near future. 
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The last component is the Bidders. The responsibility of the Bidders is to trade goods 
according to the target set by AAS at good price and good time. The Bidders are 
composed of a set of small autonomous software bidding robots (bid-bots). Although 
bid-bot has agent properties, we do not call that an "agent" in this thesis to prevent 
confusion. Each bid-bot trades one type of goods in an auction according to its 
auction protocol. The bid-bots decide how to trade items of goods in the most 
profitable way. They may not strictly follow the target set by AAS. The bid-bots can 
decrease the number of items to bid while prices are increasing dramatically. When it 
is not a good opportunity, a bid-bot can also wait and do not bid target items 
immediately. The bidding strategies used for various auction protocols will be covered 
in more detail in later section. 
Table 4: High level planning of our agent model 
While auctions are still running 
• Update the status and current prices for all auctions 
• Estimate marginal costs of all goods items (performed by CE) 
參 Determine an allocation with most profit obtainable (performed by AAS) 
參 Convert the allocation into a target list of goods items (performed by AAS) 
參 Bid the desired items by mechanisms tailor-made for the auction protocols 
(performed by the Bidders) 
The above table shows how tasks are divided for components in high level planning 
described in last chapter. The detailed mechanisms for Cost Estimator (CE), 
Allocation and Acquisition Solver (AAS) and the Bidders are explained in following 
sections. 
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4.2 Cost Estimator (CE) 
CE uses priceline data structure (Greenwald and Boyan, 2001a) to present all 
marginal costs in a universal format. At any time, an item of goods might be held, 
possibly held or to be acquired. In addition, various goods can be traded in different 
auction protocols. An agent requires a set of prediction mechanisms to deal with all 
possible cases. 
4.2,1 Closed auction 
Regardless of auction protocol, the marginal cost of an item is either zero or infinity 
when all auctions trading this type of goods were closed. The zero marginal cost 
indicates that it is a sunk cost. The item is already paid but it is not reusable for 
another purpose. The infinity marginal cost indicates that items are not available any 
more in the market. Suppose h is the number of items of goods g won in a closed 
auction. 
For priceline p^ = < …尸灿尸… > ’ 
fO if i<h 
p . = < [oo otherwise 
Consider an example in TAG scenario. Suppose auction for hotel reservation TT at 
day 3 (TT3) was already closed, and the CUHK agent won three reservations. Then, 
the priceline is given by PTJ2=< 0, 0, 0, oo, oo, oo ...>. The leading zeros for the first 
three items indicate that those items were already held. Since hotel reservations are 
not allowed for resale in TAC, there are sunk costs. The following infinity indicates 
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that it is impossible to acquire those items any more. In TAC, there is only one 
auction for each type of hotel reservations. An agent cannot acquire items which 
auction for that type of goods was already closed. 
Pm = <0,0, 0, 00, 00,……> 
< , • 
sunk cost 
4.2.2 Open "take-it or leave-it，，market 
In "take-it or leave-it" market with sufficient supply, an agent can acquire items at the 
current price instantaneously. There is no certainty in clearing price. The marginal 
cost of an item to be acquired is simply the current price, ASK. When items are not 
allowed for resale, the paid price is a sunk cost. The marginal cost of a paid and held 
item equals to zero. Suppose h is the number of items of goods g acquired in an open 
"take-it or leave-it" market. 
For priceline p^ = <广 " p灿 p 州 > ， 
_ J 0 if i<h 
_ [ASK otherwise 
Consider an example in TAC scenario. Suppose the CUHK agent holds two inbound 
flight tickets at day 2 (IN2) and the current ASK is 350. The priceline is given by 
PIN2-<0, 0’ 350, 350...>. The two held flight tickets are not allowed for resale in 
TAC. On the other hand, the CUHK agent is able to acquire more flight tickets at 350 
per ticket. 
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4.2.3 Open continuous double auction (CDA) 
Continuous Double Auction refers to a market allowing an agent to buy and sell 
simultaneously. An agent could resell held items of goods to other agents in a double 
auction. The marginal cost of a held item is equal to the highest bid in market (BID). 
It is not a sunk cost because an agent can obtain additional profit by reselling that held 
item at price BID. Thus, there is an opportunity cost equals BED. 
On the other hand, the marginal cost of an item to be acquired is equal to the lowest 
selling price in market (ASK). In double auction, an agent can acquire an item at price 
ASK immediately. We assume that the clearing prices are stable in an efficient 
double-sided trading market. Therefore, an agent can acquire multiple desired items at 
price ASK. Suppose h is the number of items of goods g acquired in an open 
continuous double auction. 
For priceline p^ = < 尸 , … > ’ 
_{BID if i<h 
~ |A5/s： if i>h 
Consider an example in TAC scenario. Suppose the auction for entertainment ticket 
AW at day 1 (AWl) has ASK of 50 and BID of 30. The CUHK agent currently holds 
3 AWl tickets. The priceline is given by 30, 30, 50, 50, 50 ..">. 
Entertainment tickets are allowed for resale in TAC. The marginal costs of three held 
entertainment tickets are opportunity costs equals 30. If the tickets are not allocated to 
clients, an agent can obtain additional utility by reselling them at price 30. The 
marginal costs of entertainment tickets to be acquired equal 50. We assume those 
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tickets can be acquired from other agents at price ASK. 
PAW\ = < 30, 30，30，50，50， > 
< • 
opportunity cost 
The demand and supply are dynamic in double auction because it depends on 
participating agents. When a market has limited demand, an agent may not easily 
resell some held items to other agents. The situation is similar to a market in which 
resale is not allowed. The marginal costs of non-resalable items would become zero, 
(i.e. BID = 0) When a market has limited supply, an agent may not easily to acquire 
some desired items. The situation is similar to a closed auction where items are 
unavailable. The marginal costs of unavailable items would equal their highest 
obtainable profit, (i.e. ASK = highest obtainable profit) 
Consider another example in TAC scenario. Suppose now no agent sells entertainment 
tickets in the auction for AWl. The CUHK agent considers the marginal cost of AWl 
is equal to 200, which is the maximum utility obtainable of an entertainment ticket in 
TAC. An agent can generate more profit by selling the held tickets at 200 rather than 
allocating the tickets to clients. It is reasonable to assume other agents are willing to 
sell their held tickets at price 200. 




4.2.4 Open multi-unit ascending auction 
Multi-unit ascending auction requires agents to offer bids higher than ASK. The 
transactions clear once at the end of an auction with price equals ASK. The top bids 
win those items of goods. An agent needs to reason under uncertainty since clearing 
prices are unknown. 
One possible prediction method is considering marginal costs of all goods equal to 
their asking prices, ASK. Suppose ASK of goods g is 100, the priceline is given by 
pg =<100, 100, 100 "•>. In competitive markets, clearing prices of goods could be 
skyrocketing. The ASK is not so useful since it can change dramatically afterward. An 
agent may then acquire non-profitable items of goods due to the inaccurate predicted 
marginal costs. 
4.4.2.1 Historical clearing prices 
In a market with uncertainty, we believe an agent can improve accuracy of prediction 
by referencing a series of recent historical clearing prices. It is based on an 
assumption that collective behavior of opponents would not change dramatically. First, 
historical clearing prices acts as a measurement of opponents' aggressiveness. 
Although an individual opponent's strategy is unknown, the collective behaviors are 
observable through the historical clearing prices. Second, the finalized outcome of an 
agent's strategy is already reflected in recent historical clearing prices. The same 
strategy of an agent would result in consistent outcomes if collective behaviors of 
opponents do not change dramatically. 
I 
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In TAC, we use median of clearing prices in 10 most recently played games for 
representing outcomes of historical auctions. Median is used instead of mean to 
reduce effects from abrupt clearing prices. Some agents did not submit bids until the 
first hotel auction close (at the end of minute). It results in a very low ASK during 
first few minutes. In several game instances, the ASK can reach as low as zero. 
Referencing historical clearing prices is useful for marginal cost prediction when ASK 
and BID are not accurate enough. 
Most TAC agents have submitted their bids before the first hotel auction closed. Since 
hotel auction closing order is random, it is impossible for an agent to predict which 
hotel auction closes first. Consequently, an agent needs to bid all desired hotel 
reservations before the first hotel auction closed. After the first hotel auction closed, 
the ASK and BED possibly rise dramatically. At that time, ASK and BID become 
much useful because they reflect most opponents' valuations on hotel reservations. 
OL • For open hotel auction, 
Marginal cost = max(ASK，（1- a ) x ASK + a x median) 
1 
0.5 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Time (min.) 
4 8 12 
Figure 8: The marginal cost prediction which considers historical clearing prices 
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The CUHK agent uses a function of ASK and median to predict marginal costs in the 
middle of a game instance. A parameter a is used to represent the relative importance 
between ASK and median. Before the first hotel auction closes, the CUHK agent 
considers median as the marginal cost because ASK provides no useful information. 
For priceline 戶发 = < … 炉… > ’ 
p广 MC and MC = msix{ASK, 1 - a(t)x ASK + a{t)x Median) 
where Median is median of clearing prices of goods g in last 10 played games 
a(t) is a user-defined weight function of time t 
After the first hotel auction closes, the importance of median sharply drops to 50% in 
order to adapt the current market. After the eighth minute, the market is believed to be 
settled. Therefore, the CUHK agent considers ASK as the marginal cost of goods 
directly. 
Suppose auction for hotel reservations SS2 has median of 80 and ASK of 20 at the 
end of the fourth minute. The marginal cost of SS2 is predicted to be 80 x 0.5 + 20 x 
0.5 = 50. Thus, the priceline is given by PSS2 =<^0, 50，50,...>. 
4.4.2.2 Increasing marginal costs 
When clearing prices of goods are uncertain, an agent's allocation should not heavily 
depend on a few types of goods. Otherwise, the penalty of an inaccurate prediction 
will be high. We propose a set of rules an agent should follow for predicting marginal 
cost of goods with unknown clearing prices. 
35 
Table 5: Rules for increasing marginal cost of uncertain goods 
Rules 
1. MCgj ^ MCg,i f o r ; ^ I 
2. IfMCi.j ^ MCnj, then MCgj ^ MCuj for i ^ 1 
where MQ,/ refers to the marginal cost for 产 item of goods g 
The first rule implies that the marginal cost of goods g should be increasing. The 
second rule implies that the marginal cost of 产 item should be higher if that type of 
goods is predicted to be more expensive. The first rule causes an agent to bid fewer 
items. The second rule causes an agent to bid fewer items of goods which are 
predicted to be more expensive. The first and second rules altogether prevent an agent 
from depending on a few kinds of goods. 
For priceline Pg =< Pgi".Pgi…>， 
\MC, = MC p . = MCi and ! � ‘ ImCi. = / ( M C " ) 
where f{x, n) is a user-defined function that satisfies the 2 rules above 
Consider an example in TAC scenario. Define MCss4 as the marginal cost of hotel 
reservation SS at day 4 based on the methods we described earlier (i.e. MCss4=50). 
Our CUHK agent uses MCss4 as a baseline to calculate all marginal costs of goods 
SS4. The calculation is very straightforward. The marginal cost of hotel reservation, 
MCss4’i，is equal to AfC拟 x / . The priceline is given by P554 =<50, 100’ 150, 
200...>. 
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First, the CUHK agent targets on fewer hotel reservations. It is understandable as the 
marginal costs of hotel reservations are increasing; bidding too many hotel 
reservations is very costly. Second, the CUHK agent targets on fewer hotel 
reservations which are predicted to be expensive. It is because the second reservation 
of an expensive hotel is already very expensive. When more hotel reservations are 
needed for an allocation, the CUHK agent prefers reservations with lower prices. 
Third, the CUHK agent does not heavily depend on one type of hotel reservations. 
Suppose M C s s 3 is lower than MCrn. The CUHK prefers SS hotel for the first few 
reservations. Once the agent's allocation already contains a few hotel reservations of 
SS3, the marginal cost of an additional SS3 hotel reservation becomes higher than that 
of an additional TT3 hotel reservation. 
Pss2=< 50，100, 150，200，....> • 
Marginal cost are increasing 
4.4.2.3 Bid winning probability 
In a multi-unit ascending auction, usually an agent is not allowed to withdraw its bids. 
In other words, an agent makes a commitment to acquire its won items of goods at 
clearing price for each bid it made. An agent possibly wins items when their bids are 
over the current price ASK. The commitments are removed only when an agent no 
longer possibly wins the associated items, i.e. other agents place bids on top of their 
bids. 
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Under particular conditions, several commitments can be considered as fixed and not 
removable again. First, the commitments are unlikely removable when too many of 
items are can possibly be won. Second, it is unlikely that other agents will make new 
bids to compete with us when ASK become already so high. Since an agent should 
acquire those items later anyway, the marginal costs become sunk costs. 
We define bid winning probability as how likely an agent wins the bid items. In TAC, 
our CUHK agent estimates the bid winning probability based on the BID to ASK ratio. 
When BID is close to ASK, we predict other agents will place bids over our bids soon. 
Thus, commitments of bids are likely to be removable. When ASK is far higher than 
BID, it is likely that there is no further demand for hotel reservations. Thus, 
commitments of bids are likely fixed. 
Figure 9: The bid winning probability calculated from the BID to ASK ratio 
Winning probability 
A 
t 0 0.5 1 BID/ASK 
38 
For priceline p^ =< P广..P州 P 咖 > ’ 
0 if i<H 
otherwise 
where H is the number of items of goods g considered to be surely won 
Consider an example in TAC scenario. Suppose our CUHK agent possibly wins 4 
hotel reservations SS at day 4 (SS4) and the calculated bid winning probability is 0.5. 
Then, we consider the agent surely wins two hotel reservations (4 x 0.5). Suppose 
marginal cost of SS4 is predicted to be 50. The priceline is given by P^^^ =<0, 0’ 50’ 
100, 150,200...>. 
4,3 Allocation and Acquisition Solver (AAS) 
AAS is the most important component in our agent model. It proposes profitable 
bundles for clients and then generates a target bidding list of items. AAS takes a set of 
estimated marginal costs from CE as input. Accuracy and speed are the two key issues 
in AAS design. The accuracy denotes the optimality of AAS output allocation. 
Generally, a faster AAS provides less accurate allocation. 
4.3.1 Un-coordinated VS coordinated aspiration 
AAS solves both bundle completion problem and allocation problem by a function of 
marginal costs. There is no unique approach to design that function. A trading agent 
could adopt 1) un-coordinated or 2) coordinated aspiration to their clients. 
Uncoordinated aspiration implies that an agent aspire to maximize the profit of each 
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client. "Livingagents", the top scoring agent in TAC ’01，was taking un-coordinated 
aspiration (Fritschi and Dorer, 2002). It allocated the most profitable travel package 
for each single client without considering global profit. Coordinated aspiration 
implies that an agent aspire to maximize global profit of all clients. "ATTac", the 
runner-up in TAC，01，was taking coordinated aspiration (Stone el al, 2002). It took 
whole clients' utility and overall expenditure in consideration. 
Coordinated aspiration is more reasonable because a trading agent aims at 
maximizing whole profit. Maximizing local profit for each client may not offer a 
global optimal to an agent. The coordinated aspiration is also more flexible because 
an item can be used for many possible allocations. In contrast, coordinated aspiration 
consumes more computational resources but is not guaranteed to work better than 
uncoordinated aspiration. A good example is "livingagent" obtaining the highest score 
in TAC '01. It is because prices of goods are dynamic and unknown to the agents. 
With coordinated aspiration, a small change in goods price may already affect whole 
allocation. The worst situation is when an agent keep modifying its allocation. With 
uncoordinated aspiration, an allocation does not change easily by a small change in 
prices. As a result, an agent becomes more stable and avoids frequent changes in 
allocation. 
4.3.2 Optimal VS heuristic approach 
There are 2 common approaches to find the best allocation: 1) optimal approach and 2) 
heuristic approach. The optimal approach aspires to find an optimal solution while the 
heuristic approach aspires to find an approximate solution. The optimal approach 
provides an optimal solution but it can be time-consuming. Linear programming (LP) 
4 0 
and A* search are typical examples of optimal approach (Greenwald and Boyan, 
2001b). The heuristic approach is fast but less accurate. Greedy search is one 
example. 
The optimality described above assumes predicted marginal costs provided by CE are 
exactly the clearing prices of goods items. Since there is no perfect cost prediction 
method for goods with unknown clearing prices, even an optimal approach is not 
guaranteed to find the best allocation. On the other hand, a heuristic approach already 
provides a high-quality solution with faster speed. 
4.3.3 An greedy approach with coordinated aspiration 
In TAC, our CUHK agent adopts a greedy heuristic search to allocate items to clients. 
The figure below illustrates its allocation strategy. 
Table 6: The allocation strategy of our CUHK agent 
• INPUT 
• A set of estimated marginal costs 
• MAIN PROCEDURE 
• Generate a random order of clients 
• Allocate provisional travel packages to clients 
• Calculate global profit 
• Repeat N times 
• OUTPUT: 
• An allocation with highest global profit 
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The greedy search algorithm of the CUHK agent is modified from the Roxybot's 
Beam Search (Greenwald and Boyan, 2001b). We set the beam width equals one (i.e. 
best-first search). Given a client order, AAS allocates items client by client. The first 
client can pick any item to construct a travel package with the highest profit. Then, 
the second client picks any item from remaining items to construct his/her travel 
package. This process repeats until all clients have been considered. Notice that the 
items are not necessary held by a trading agent. Some allocated items can be acquired 
later. 
As greedy search can lead to a suboptimal, the CUHK agent performs the greedy 
search over N random client orders. The allocation with highest global profit is then 
selected. The optimality improves when the number of trials increases. Experiments 
show that Beam Search with width equals one has averaged (or median) accuracy of 
99% in TAC scenario (Greenwald and Boyan, 2001b; Stone et al., 2001). 
4 2 
Client order: 2, 8, 3, 7, 6, 5, 4, 1 
^ ^ j ... \ Pick the best travel oackaae for client 2 
© 
depth = 8 j \ 
Pick the best travel Dackaae for client 8 各o……… 
Figure 10: A greedy search with coordinated aspiration to clients 
The CUHK agent divides the whole allocation process into 2 stages. In the first stage, 
only flight tickets and hotel reservations are allocated. It is because they are the 
essential elements for bundling feasible travel packages. In the second stage, the 
entertainment tickets are allocated. 
o 个 
/ … \ 
… \ feasible package, depth = 8 
〇 
〇 个 
• • • entertainment tickets, depth = 8 
• • • 
O I 
Figure 11: The 2-phase greedy search 
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The CUHK agent adopts coordinated aspiration to clients because it is more 
reasonable and flexible. The CUHK agent adopts heuristic approach because it is 
faster and already accurate enough. Optimal approach like A* search or linear 
programming is not computational efficient for larger problems. Beam search with 
beam width equals one has complexity 0(m) where m is the number of clients. The 
complexity becomes O(mN) over N trials of beam search. The accuracy and speed of 
beam search are controllable by the trial number N. 
4.4 The Bidders 
The bid-bots, which are inside the Bidders, trade target items of goods set by AAS 
according to the prevailing auction protocols. 
4,4,1 "Take-it or leave-it，，market 
In a "take-it or leave-it" market, an agent can acquire any quantity of goods by the 
asking price (ASK) immediately. Thus, a bid equals ASK is sufficient to acquire the 
desired items. There is no uncertainty for bidding goods in a market using "take-it or 
leave-it" mechanism. 
Goods inside a bundle are interacting. Some of them are traded in auctions with 
unknown clearing prices. An agent prefers to acquire all uncertain goods inside a 
bundle before bidding goods with known clearing prices. In a "take-it or leave-it" 
market, an agent always delays bidding when the asking prices are predicted to be 
unchanged. 
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Sometimes, the asking price in a "take-it or leave-it" market may have an increasing 
trend. Then, an agent faces a dilemma either 1) bid items earlier for lower prices, or 2) 
bid items later for more flexible planning. 
Consider an example in TAC scenario. Flight tickets are traded in markets using 
"take-it or leave-it" mechanism in TAC. Since TAC '01 tournament, the game rule 
was changed such that flight ticket price has an increasing trend. On the other hand, 
flight tickets and hotel reservations are interacting because both of them are essential 
for travel package feasibility. 
To solve the dilemma, the CUHK agent bids flight tickets twice within a TAC game 
instance: the beginning and the last minute. At the beginning, the prices of flight 
tickets are expected to be lowest. For that reason, the CUHK agent bids all desired 
flight tickets in the target list given by A AS. At the last minute, all auctions for hotel 
reservation were closed. There is no further uncertainty associated with travel package 
feasibility. Thus, the most profitable travel packages for clients are determined. The, 
our CUHK agent bid all remains flight tickets for completing those profitable travel 
packages. 
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Table 7: The bidding strategy for flight tickets in TAC 
1. Initialize 
參 Bid all flight tickets needed for initial allocation T with bids set to ASK 
2. While some hotel auctions are running 
• Do nothing 
3. Finalize 
• Bid remains flight tickets needed for the best allocation T with bids set to ASK 
4.4.2 Multi-unit ascending auction 
An agent need to reason under uncertainty when it bids goods in multi-unit ascending 
auction. The opponents' strategies are unknown but only limited items are available. 
Depends on agents' demands for goods, clearing prices sometimes can be low but 
sometimes can be skyrocketed. Worse, items become unavailable after all auctions 
selling that type of goods are closed. As goods are interacting inside a bundle, an 
agent fails to complete bundles for clients if it cannot acquire enough goods items. An 
agent faces both game playing problem and bundle completion problem in multi-unit 
ascending auction (see Chapter one). 
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Table 8: The bidding strategy for hotel reservations in TAC 
1. Initialize 
參 Bid hotel reservations using Low price bidding 
2. Until the first hotel auctions close 
參 Bid insufficient hotel reservations by incrementing ASK 
3. While some hotel auctions are running 
• Bid hotel reservations using Budget bidding 
4.4.2.1 Budget bidding 
Suppose a bundle contains some goods traded in multi-unit ascending auctions. In a 
multi-unit ascending auction, the top bids win the items at the clearing price (i.e. the 
lowest winning price). We propose an agent's budget for bidding goods inside a 
bundle should be equal to its utility obtainable from that bundle. If the budget for 
completing a bundle is more than its utility obtainable, an agent can end up with a loss. 
If the budget is less than its utility obtainable, an agent has smaller chance in 
completing the bundle. 
The CUHK agent starts budget bidding since one cycle prior to the first hotel auction 
closes. The bidding prices of hotel reservations are calculated based on the formula 
below. 
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For each client c. Bid = [uAp)-cost)/AA 
where 
Bidcg is bidding price used by client c for an item of goods g 
(p) is utility of client c over travel package p 
CO St flight is total cost for inbound and outbound tickets to be acquired later 
AA is the number of remains hotel reservations required for travel package p 
We illustrate it by an example. In TAC, hotel reservations are traded in multi-unit 
ascending auction. Suppose AAS allocated a feasible travel package p to client 3 
with utility of 800. The arrival day and return day of p are day 1 and day 4 
respectively. Hotel SS is selected in p such that there is no hotel premium for client 
3. 
The utility obtainable is 800 if an agent can successfully complete travel package p 
for client 3. Assume inbound and outbound tickets are ready for p such that they 
cost nothing (sunk cost). The SS2 reservation, which auction was already closed, is 
ready for p as well. Hence, budget for bidding two remains hotel reservations, SSI 
and SS3, is 800. Our CUHK agent divides the budget into two bids of 400 each. 
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Bidding price = 400 
^ Day 
1 2 3 
Figure 12: Budget bidding in multi-unit ascending auction 
The budget did not include hotel auction SS2 because it is already paid (sunk cost). 
The budget is re-calculated after each cycle. Suppose auction for SSI closed first with 
clearing price 300’ the new bidding price for SS3 become 800. 
Unlike aggressive agent which always bids at very high price, the CUHK agent 
employs divisions of utility as bidding prices. It prevents an agent from completing 
the travel package with a loss. Suppose bidding prices of SSI and SS3 are set as 500, 
the profit become negative when sum of their clearing prices is over 800. 
4.4.2.2 Low price bidding 
Interacting goods inside a bundle can be traded in simultaneous multi-unit ascending 
auctions. Since clearing prices are unknown, some agents can underestimate market 
demands of those goods at the beginning. When the agents discover this mistake, 
most auctions may be already closed. As a result, the agents cannot change their 
allocation anymore from limited available goods. The agents may then compete for 
remain goods aggressively, causing the clearing prices become skyrocketing. 
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We propose that an agent can stabilize market by submitting a series of low bids to 
multi-unit ascending auction. As lower winning positions are occupied by our bids, 
competitors need to bids over them in order to acquire their desired items. It 
stimulates competitors to actively participate. When asking price (ASK) is pushed to a 
high level earlier, competitors recognize the demand for this type of goods is high. 
Hence, a few agents switch to acquire other goods to avoid a non-profitable bid war. 
Effectively, it prevents agents from fighting against each others aggressively. Since 
the market becomes more efficient and stable, clearing prices are more predictable. 
Additionally, an agent can win items at low clearing prices when the demand for that 
type of goods is low. The low price items provide more flexibility to an agent in 
constructing bundles for clients. 
Now we describe how the CUHK agent performs low price bidding in TAC. For each 
kind of hotel reservation, the CUHK agent submits a series of low bids. The bid of 
f i\ 
hotel reservation is Ax l-y' where 义 is a controllable parameter defining 
V / 
expensiveness and y is an accepting threshold. In our implementation, X is set to be 
I bl^ 
100 and y is set to be 0.5. The calculation is based on an inequal i ty{J( l -—) > / . 
The part 小 1 一字)in inequality computes a degree of inexpensiveness (DI), A high 
value of DI means that the item is a bargain. If a bid has DI over the threshold y, then 
an agent accepts that bid. DI is discounted exponentially for additional hotel 
reservations. Thus, the bids for additional reservations are decreasing. 
5 0 
A accepting degree 
1 \ The bid for 2nd item 
。『 \ \ Z y The bid foM St item 
^ ： ^ ~ 、 fc price 
0 ^ ^ A =100 
Figure 13: Low price bidding in multi-unit ascending auction 
The CUHK agent submits this series of low bids at the beginning of a game instance. 
Afterwards, the CUHK agent continues to bid insufficient hotel reservations for the 
target set by AAS. The bids are equals to ASK x Od where is a controllable 
parameter. 
4.4.3 Continuous double auction (CDA) 
We propose an agent to use FL-strategy to trade goods in CDA. The FL-strategy was 
first proposed by He and Leung (He & Leung, 2001). The FL-strategy makes use of 
fuzzy reasoning and fuzzy rules to decide the optimal bid or ask in CDA. ^^  
Moreover, the fundamental FL-strategy can be enhanced by introducing an adaptive 
risk attitude. 
The original study of FL-strategy focuses on trading single item without considering 
interacting goods. An agent can behave either buyer or seller, but not both. Besides, 
16 See Definition 
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the original FL-strategy assumes that an agent has well-defined valuations over all 
items of goods. These assumptions do not hold when client preferences are over 
bundles. 
In this thesis, we developed a simplified version of FL-strategy and have integrated it 
into our CUHK agent implementation. In TAC, the CUHK agent bids the 
entertainment tickets once per cycle (minute) starting from the beginning of a game 
instance until the end of the instance. 
4.4.3.1 Review of fuzzy reasoning mechanism 
Consider the following set of fuzzy firing rules from R1 to RN: 
Table 9: Fuzzy firing rules 
Rl: If X is Ai and y is B2, then z is ci 
R2: If X is A2 and y is B2, then 1 is C2 
RN: If J： is AN and y is 5N, then 1 is CN 
where A,, and 5, are fuzzy sets and Q is a real number. 
Suppose the following facts are true: jc is xo and y is yo. For each rule Ri, the firing 
level ai is calculated as min {(Ai(xo), Biiyo)} where Ai(x) and Bi(y) are membership 
functions 口. 
17 Membership function returns a degree of membership of one variable in a fuzzy set. 
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The overall result zo equals the "weighted average" of all c,-. 
I...N 
The calculated result zo is not always a valid value in some scenarios. For example, 
some markets require agents increase their bids by a pre-set incremental value. A 
fuzzy number representation can be used to resolve this problem. In original 
FL-strategy, the result zo is extended to a triangular fuzzy number Zq = {m,6,z) 
whether m is the center, 6 and x are left and right spreads. The previous result zo 
become the centre of ? � ( i . e . zo=m), which has highest degree of membership. 
Define D as a set of all valid values, which has degree of membership higher than a 
pre-set threshold n. Then, FL-strategy selects the value with the highest degree of 





m-Q m m+x —e 
Figure 14: Triangular fiizzy number, Zq = {m,0 ,x ) 
In TAC, there is no price stepping requirement for bid. Hence, the CUHK agent uses 
the real number zo for simplicity. 
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4.4.3.2 Fuzzy Reasoning in FL-strategy 
Our simplified FL-strategy decides the optimal bid and ask based on ASK, BID and a 
reference price (PR). The principle of using a reference price is straightforward. It is 
easier for an agent to decide bid and ask based on trading experiences. Unlike original 
FL-strategy, our simplified version does not consider valuations of items. First, it is 
hard to assess the values of items while goods are interacting. Second, the target 
goods items set by AAS are already believed to be profitable. 
In the original FL-strategy, the clearing price in a pre-set number of transactions ago 
is taken as the reference price (PR).^^ It is based on an assumption that the supply and 
demand of market are relatively stable. When a market is very dynamic, it is better to 
use the latest clearing price as a reference point. Consider TAC as an example. The 
uncertainty of clearing prices is decreasing during a game instance in TAC. Some ‘ 
competitors, like ATTac and SouthamptonTAC, increase bid (decrease ask) steadily to 
keep optimistic option at the beginning (Stone et al , 2001; He and Jennings, 2002). 
Hence, our CUHK agent takes the latest clearing price as a reference price PR. 
There are three possible cases^^ for the relation between BID, ASK and PR: 
1. PR ^ BID < ASK 
2. BID < ASK ^ PR 
3. BED ^ PR ^ ASK 
18 For example, an agent can take the clearing price 3 transactions ago as PR. Assume the latest three 
clearing prices are {80，100，90}, then PR is 80. 
19 BID is always less than ASK. Otherwise, there is a transaction. 
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Same as original FL-strategy, simple fuzzy rules are used for the first two cases. Here 
we study the selling side first. 
參 When PR ^ BID < ASK, 
IF BID is much一bigger than PR 
THEN accept BID 
ELSE ask ^ (ASK-y^ ,.；) 
When BID is higher than PR, it implies that the standing BID is in a relatively high 
level. When BID is much bigger than PR, an agent should sell goods immediately at 
that attractive price. Even if BID is not much bigger than PR, an agent can reduce ask 
by a great amount to attract buyers. 
參 When BID < ASK ^ PR 
IF ASK is much_smaller than PR 
THEN no new asked 
ELSE ask<-(ASK-y5,.2) 
When ASK is smaller than PR, it implies that the standing ASK is in a relatively low 
level. When ASK is much smaller than PR, a seller should not sell goods at that 
unfavorite price. Otherwise, it will benefit to other competitors. If ASK is not much 
smaller than PR, an agent can reduce ask by a little bit even that price is not so good. 
The reason is that the item is still a target item set by AAS. 
The relation “muchjbigger” and “much一smaller” above are fuzzy sets. Denote “x is 
much一bigger than /，as fuzzy set A. If membership function A{x-y) return a degree 
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Figure 15: Fuzzy sets used in simple fuzzy rules 
The rules for buying side are using the same understanding but in a reverse way. 
• When BID < ASK ^ PR 
IF ASK is much_smaller than PR 
THEN accept ASK 
ELSE bid (BID + j h j ) 
• When PR ^ BID < ASK, 
IF BID is much一bigger than PR 
THEN no new bid 
ELSE bid《（BID+A,2) 
The last case (BID ^ PR ^ ASK) is not as straightforward as previous 2 cases. 
When PR falls between BID and ASK, it is hard to tell whether the current market 
situation is a good opportunity. In this case, we employ the fuzzy firing rules and 
fuzzy reasoning mechanisms introduced above. We define three more fuzzy sets: 
“close一to”, ‘‘medium—to” and “farjrom”, 
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dose—to medium一 to far—from 
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Figure 16: Fuzzy sets used in complicated fuzzy reasoning mechanisms 
We study the selling side first: 
Table 10: Fuzzy rules for selling side 
• IF (BED is farjrom or medium—to PR) and 
(ASK isfarjrom PR) 
THEN a s k ^ ( A S K -?ts. i ) 
• IF (BID is far Jrom or medium一to PR) and 
(ASK is mediumjo PR) 
THEN ask ^ ( A S K 2 ) 
• IF (BID is /ar Jrom or mediumjo PR) and 
(ASK is close-to PR) 
THEN ask + (ASK-?is,3) 
參 IF BID is closejo PR 
THEN ask <r (PR +^,4) 
When BID is far from PR, an agent need to reduce ask to attract buyers. When ask 
become closer to PR, less profit is obtainable by the agent. Thus, the agent reduces 
ask by a smaller amount when ask become closer to PR. 
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Similarly, the fuzzy firing rules for buying side are as follow: 
Table 11: Fuzzy rules for buyer side: 
• IF (ASK is far_Jrom or mediumjo PR) and 
(BED i^farjwm PR) 
THEN bid • (BID + A.b.i) 
參 IF (ASK is farjrom or mediumjo PR) and 
(BID is mediumjo PR) 
THEN bid <- (BID + ^5,2) 
• IF (ASK farjrom or mediumjo PR) and 
(BID is close—to PR) 
THEN bid <r (BED + 
• IF ASK is closejo PR 
THEN bid^(PR-A,b,4) 
In our simplified FL-strategy, an agent has a feature of relaxed acceptable price. The 
same feature can also be found in design of SouthamptonTAC (He and Jennings, 2002) 
in TAC ‘01. Suppose ask is calculated as 100 based on the fuzzy reasoning 
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Figure 17: Relaxed acceptable price in FL-strategy 
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4.4.3.3 Adaptive Risk Attitude 
The last feature of FL-strategy is the adaptive risk attitude. Define RISK as a risk 
attribute which is bounded by -1 and +1. In our simplified version, an agent has 2 
separate attributes for buying side and selling side, RISK^ and RISKs. The risk 
attributes are adjusted based on previous transactions. The learning rules are as 
following�。： 
• IF The selling (buying) transaction is—active 
THEN RISKi = RISKi (1 + G*is_active) 
• IF The selling (buying) transaction is—inactive 
THEN RISKi = RISKi (1 - o*is_inactive) 
where i = {5,^} and a is the maximum step. Define transaction rate (TR) is ratio 
between total sold quantity and target selling quantity in previous cycle. Suppose 
target selling quantity was 10 and sold quantity was 4，TR equals 0.4. The relation 
is—active and is—inactive are fuzzy sets. If the degree of is_active(TR) is higher than a 
pre-set threshold TCactive’ an agent considers the transactions (in previous cycle) is 
active. 
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Figure 18: Fuzzy sets used in learning risk attributes 
Finally, the parameters (p, y, X) are adjusted based on new calculated risk attributes. 
There is no unique approach to adjust those parameters. Basically, an agent reduces 
ask by a smaller amount when RISKs is higher. Similarly, an agent increase bid by a 
smaller amount when RISKb is higher. The following equations describe how the 
CUHK agent did in TAC ‘02. 
For selling side: 
1. Ps,i = A,,/ (1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K S ) ; A , 2 = A . 2 (1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) 
2. y s j = y s j (1 + 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) ; Ys,2 = ys,2 (1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) 
3. As,J = A s j (1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) ; = 1 ,2 (1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) 
4 . /I,,.? = K 3 ( 1 - 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) ; 1 ,4 = (1 + 0 . 5 * R I S K s ) 
For buying side: 
1. Pb.i =Pb.i (1 - 0 .5*RISKb);A,2=y5, .2 (1 - 0.5*RISKb) 
2. yb,i = yb.i (1 - 0.5*RISKb)； jb.i = n,2 (1 + 0.5*RISKb) 
3. h . i = h , i (1 - 0.5*RISKb); At,2 = 4 2 (1 - 0.5*RISKb) 
4. /U,.? = ABJ (1 - 0.5*RISKb); JIB,4 = H.4 (1 + 0.5*RISKb) 
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Chapter 5 - Results 
In this chapter, we present the competition result of our CUHK agent in TAC ’02. The 
success of TAC '02 indicates the overall effectiveness of our agent model. Apart from 
the competition result, we also study the effectiveness of our agent model and its 
mechanisms under a controlled experiment environment. 
The experiments are conducted in a relative small-scale market of eight agents. This 
market size is the standard of TAC '02 tournament. All analyses concluded draw from 
TAC '02 tournament are in this market scale. Besides, we also adopt the TAC 
standard in our controlled experiments. There are two reasons for this decision. First, 
it was hard to collect working agents of world-leading researchers to conduct 
experiments locally. Researchers may not want to disclose their agents' source codes 
and the binary executables may only work in TAC standard market. Second, results 
are more convincing when they are obtained in the standard TAC '02 tournament. 
Although we can implement other researchers' agents based on their publications, it 
can be very time-consuming and developed agents are not guaranteed to perform 
identically as the original version. 
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5.1 TAC '02 Competition 
The latest TAC tournament was organized by Swedish Institute of Computer Science 
(SICS) from 17 June to 28 July, 2002. It attracted 19 teams from research labs and 
universities to participate2i. The whole TAC tournament was arranged into 4 phases: 
(i) qualifying round, (ii) seeding round, (iii) semi-final round and (iv) final round. The 
purpose of qualifying round is selecting 16 out of 19 agents to participate semi-final 
round. The seeding round aims at dividing those 16 agents into two heats of 
semi-final round^^. The top 4 agents and last 4 agents are placed into heat 1，while 
others 8 agents are placed into heat 2. After semi-final round, the 4 top scoring agents 
of each heat entry final round. The table below shows the finalists from 2000 to 2002. 
Table 12: The finalists in previous TAC tournament 
P o s i t i o n TAC ' 0 0 TAC ' 0 1 | T A C � 0 2 | _— — I -•…“‘‘“……II ……‘ 
1 ATTac 丨 Livingagents whitebear i 
2nd RoxyBoL — I A T T a c S o u t h a m p t o n T A C ‘ 
3rd Aster 11 SouthamptonTAC | Thalis ！ 
4th umbctacl ~ : w h i t e b e a r " | U M B C T ^ 
ALTA I UrIaubOl j Walverine " " " j 
6th m_rajatish j Retsina | Livingagents | 
7th RiskPro _ "|| CaiserSose fkavayaH 
8出 [ T l i | TacsMan j| Cuhk 一 
21 The full participants list is available at http://www.sics.se/tac/tacparts.php. 
22 In TAC，02’ the 8 top scoring agents in qualifying round had a place in semi-final directly. The other 
11 agents compete for 8 remaining places. 
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5.1.1 Tournament result of our working agent 
Our CUHK agent is fully implemented from our agent model. It placed one of 8 
finalists in TAC '02, out of initial 19 teams. In qualifying round (120 games), the 
CUHK agent placed the position with score 3040.30. In seeding round (440 
games), it placed the position with score 3055.42. In semifinal round (14 games), it 
placed 4th position with score 3353.54 in heat 2. In final round (32 games), it placed 
the 8th position with score 3247.83. The CUHK agent played around 500 games in 
total and obtained high positions in all rounds. From large number of games, it had 
played with many possible combinations of opponent agents. It is shown that our 
agent model performed well in all possible scenarios. 
All 3 top scoring agents^^ in qualifying round obtain scores over 3300, which are 300 
ahead of the CUHK agent. The score difference is pretty large. It is because the 
CUHK agent did not consider historical clearing prices before entering seeding round. 
Afterward, the CUHK agent became one of five agents obtaining score over 3000 in 
seeding round. The scores of top few agents were very close in seeding round. The top 
scoring agent, ATTac, had score 3131.25 which is only 3% ahead of our CUHK agent. 
During final round, games were running in two separate TAC servers 
simultaneously^"^. Each server consists of 16 games. Participating teams needed to run 
two agents for both servers independently. Initially, we used different bidding 
strategies for two separate servers. The CUHK agent bid low price hotel reservations 
in one server but not in another server. After each server finished 9 games, we 
23 The 3 top scoring agents in qualifying round are "whitebear", "livingagents" and "UMBCTAC". 
24 The two servers are “tac.sics.se，’ and "tac4.sics.se". 
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observed that the CUHK agent which bid low price hotel reservations had a better 
performance. Hence, we decided to bid low price hotel reservations for 7 remains 
games in both servers. 
Unfortunately, we made a mistake running both two agents in one server but no agent 
in another server (the 10出 game). We stopped and restarted the agents immediately 
after we discovered this mistake. However, it was too late because two agents already 
acquired duplicate flight tickets in one server. Also, the prices of flight tickets in 
another server already rose a lot after we restarted the agent. 
If we did not make this mistake, the CUHK agent would place the position with 
score 3301.41. The new score is calculated by discarding scores of all finalists in the 
IQth game of both servers^^. 
Table 13: The adjusted average scores of all agents after discarding the 10''' game in both servers. 
Position Agent tac.sics.se tac4.sics.se Overall 
1 Whitebear 3379.1 3675.6 3527.3 
2 SouthamptonTAC 3521.6 3351.7 3436.6 
3 Thalis 3380.2 3312.8 3346.5 
4 Cuhk 3226.5 3376.3 3301.4 
5 UMBCTAC 3259.2 3322.7 3291.0 
6 Walverine 3255.8 3295.7 3275.7 
7 livingagents26 3516.7 3006.8 3261.8 
8 kavayaH 2942.4 3418.2 3180.3 
25 Game 4589 in tac.sics.se and game 446 in tac4.sics.se. 
26 Livingagents missed 2 games in the server in tac4.siscs.se during the final round because of the 
timing problem. 
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5.1.2 Comparisons between CUHK, ATTac and Roxybot 
In chapter two, we had discussed three recent researches on online auctions: Priceline, 
ATTac, and Roxybot. Priceline is a data structure storing predicted marginal costs of 
good items in vectors. It reduces complexity by converting the bundle completion 
problem into a function of marginal costs. In contrast, Priceline itself does not 
improve agent performance where cost prediction mechanisms do. ATTac and 
Roxybot participated in TAC '02 tournament and became two of the semi-finalists. 
The following table shows the scores of ATTac, Roxybot and our agent "CUHK" in 
qualifying and seeding rounds. 
Table 14: Comparisons of CUHK, ATTac and Roxybot in qualifying and seeding rounds 
Qualifying round (120 games) Seeding round (440 games) 
CUHK 3040.30 (7出 position) 3055.42 position) 
ATTac 1669.20 position) 3131.25 position) 
Roxybot 2900.84 position) 2855.27 position) 
In the qualifying round, the CUHK significantly outperformed the other two agents. 
However, the performance of agents became closer in the seeding round. The main 
reason was that the agents were not fully implemented and still had bugs during the 
qualifying round. The participating agents were more completed and functioning 
during the seeding round. In the semi-final round (14 games), ATTac was assigned to 
participate in heat 1 while Roxybot and our agent "CUHK" were assigned to 
participate in heat 2. Finally, ATTac and Roxybot could not place the top four in their 
heats and thus not be able to enter final round. 
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Tournament results in the semi-final round and large number of samples in the 
seeding rounds indicated that our agent performed well when compared with groups 
like ATTac and Roxybot. 
5.1.3 Low-price Bidding 
From the participating experience in TAC ’01，we believed an agent can stabilize the 
market by submitting a series of low bidding prices in multi-unit ascending auction. 
When the market become stable, clearing prices are more predictable. 
We compare average scores of all agents in semi-final round under 2 cases: I) the 
CUHK agent did not bid low price hotel reservations and, II) the CUHK agent bid low 
price hotel reservations.^^ 
Table 15: The average scores of the agents in heat 2 (with and without low price bidding) 
Agent I n Difference 
PackaTAC 3065.67 3712.34 646.7 
RoxyBot 2897.02 3816.23 919.2 
TOMAhack 2510.76 3672.64 1161.9 
Thalis 2920.61 3896.45 975.8 
Walverine 3174.47 3567.47 393.0 
cuhk 3039.48 3832.83 793.4 
sics 3030.43 3435.89 405.5 
whitebear 3162.17 3727.86 565.7 
The scores of all agents were improved when the CUHK agent bid low price hotel 
reservations. As we discussed in Chapter 5，the low bids can stimulate competitors to 
participate actively. Hence, ASK was pushed to a high level earlier. Some agents 
27 There are 9 games for case I and 5 games for case II. 
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would switch to acquire other goods when they recognize demands of some goods 
were high. Effectively, market became stable because agents are not competing 
aggressively. 
t 
5.2 Controlled Environment 
The success in TAC '02 tournament verified that our agent model and mechanisms 
work well in a wide range of situations. On the contrary, the competition results can 
only be for a reference purpose. The reason is that both TAC server and participating 
agents keep modifying during the 2-months TAC tournament. The competition result 
was not completely obtained from a controlled experiment environment (Stone et al., 
2001). A statistic analysis also illustrated that no individual agent statistically 
outperforms another individual agent. On the other hand, the analysis stated that some 
groups of agents outperform other groups of agents (Lanzi et al., 2002). 
5.2.1 Software platform 
The TAC server of version 1.0b5 was selected as the test bed platform in this thesis. 
The software is downloadable from TAC ‘02 official page^^. The previous versions 
either contain program bugs or misbehaved game rules. On the other hand, the later 
versions bundle with advanced features for competition purposes. As those advanced 




5.2.2 Aggressive agent vs. Adaptive agent 
First, we study how agents are interacting in a market. We assume there are two types 
of agent: 1) aggressive agent and 2) adaptive agent. An aggressive agent decides its 
allocation once initially and then bid those desired goods at high bidding prices. An 
adaptive agent continuous reviews its allocation and avoids bidding expensive goods. 
We believed that the minority has an advantage in a market. When there is a large 
population of aggressive agents, adaptive agents performs better because they do not 
involve in bidding wars of aggressive agents. When there is a large population of 
adaptive agents, aggressive agents performs better because they always win their 
desired goods without strong competition. 
In order to investigate how agents are interacting, we used two TAC agents to 
represent aggressive agent and adaptive agent. They were called L-agent (aggressive) 
and S-agent (adaptive). 
L-agent (aggressive agent) 
L-agent is a referencing "dummy" agent deployed by SICS team, bundled with the 
TAC server software package. The agent design was inspired by the top scoring agent 
"livingagents" in TAC '01. It is an aggressive agent with open-loop^^ strategy 
(Frilschi and Dorer，2002). 
L-agent selects the best travel packages with un-coordinated aspiration to clients (see 
Chapter 5, AAS). It takes initial flight ticket prices and average hotel clearing prices 
29 "Open loop" refers to a strategy without feedback and thus is not adaptive. 
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in the calculation. 
foreach (arrivalDay = 1 to 4) 
foreach (departureDay = arrivalDay + 1 to 5) 
foreach (hotel SS and TT) 
{ 
profit = 1000 
- inboundFlightPrice 
- o u t b o u n d F l i g h t P r i c e 







The "EntertainmentBonus" is defined as overall fun bonus minus the total tickets cost. 
L-agent assumes the cost of a single entertainment ticket always equals 80. Suppose a 
2-day travel package is allocated to a client. Then, the entertainment bonus to him 
equals (bestEntertainmentValue - 80) + (2ndBestEntertainmentValue - 80). 
L-agent bid all desired flight tickets and desired hotel reservations at the beginning of 
a game instance. The bidding prices for flight tickets are always high enough for sure 
acquisition. Alternatively, L-agent bids hotel reservations aggressively with high 
bidding price 1000. The bids for flight tickets and hotel reservations never changed 
during a game. L-agent trades desired entertainment tickets opportunistically with 
fixed prices (60 for buying and 120 for selling). 
S-agent (adaptive agent) 
The skeleton of S-agent is identical to that of the CUHK agent. It contains 
components: Cost Estimator (CE), Allocation and acquisition solver (AAS) and the 
Bidders. S-agent always bids hotel reservations by increasing ASK with a fixed 
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incremental price step. 
Summary of features of S-agent: 
參 Predicts marginal costs of goods as how the CUHK agent does 
參 Consider increasing marginal cost as how the CUHK agent does 
• Consider historical clearing prices as how the CUHK agent does 
• Flight tickets 
• Bid twice per game instance 
• Hotel reservations 
• Does not bid low price hotel reservations 
• Bid price is equal to ASK plus a fixed increment price step 
• Entertainment tickets 
• Will not bid entertainment tickets^® 
Experimental Setting 
We compared performances of S-agent and L-agent under varying population ratio. 
The whole experiment was composed of several tests. Initially, there was only one 
L-agent but there were seven S-agents. After each test of 10 games finished, we 
replaced one S-agent by another L-agent. In each test, an agent's performance was 
represented by its averaged scores over 10 games. If there were several agents of the 
same type in an experiment, the performance of that type of agents became mean of 
their averaged scores. The S.D. value refers to standard deviation of agents' scores of 
same type, not for their individual played games. 
Except the experiments for bidding strategies in continuous double auction 
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While comparing agents' performances, we always consider relative score rather than 
absolute score. First, an agent performance should be a comparative measurement. 
Second, there is randomness over agent's client preferences. Third, agent performance 
is affected by dynamic server loading and network variance. 
Experimental Results 
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Figure 19: Comparisons between the performance of aggressive agents and adaptive agents 
No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No. of S-agents 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Average scores 3837.50 3957.40 3719.00 3472.03 705.62 -518.07 -1506.56 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 168.29 129.00 188.39 322.21 580.28 555.91 
Average scores 2129.60 2676.72 2553.00 2098.13 -70.93 744.85 1815.50 
S-agent 
S.D. 680.39 359.70 375.38 365.73 1669.50 277.96 N/A 
The result is consistent with our expectation. When there are many L-agent, S-agent 
outperforms L-agents. It is because S-agents is aware of high asking price ASK and 
hence avoids bidding those expensive goods. When there are many S-agents, the 
L-agents outperform S-agents. It is because no S-agent competes with aggressive 
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L-agents. Moreover, S-agents do not fight against each other result in low clearing 
prices. Hence, L-agents always success in acquiring goods with low clearing prices. 
When there are more L-agents in a market, the average score of L-agents drop. It is 
because market advantages are shared among those L-agents. In addition, clearing 
prices are pushed to a higher level since competition become more aggressive. 
The experiment shows that aggressive agents reduce the collective profit of the 
population; while adaptive agents stabilize the market economy (even they are all 
selfish agents3i). It is perfect for an agent to behave as an aggressive agent in stable 
market and behave as an adaptive agent in non-stable market. 
The Hawk-Dove Game 
This model describes interactions between soft and tough behaviors in a population. 
Hawk is an aggressive bird and Dove is a peaceful bird. There are totally 3 cases for a 
bird meets another bird: 1) Hawk meets another Hawk, 2) Hawk meets Dove and 3) 
Dove meets another Dove. 
Table 16: Payoff of Hawk and Dove in different cases 
1 ‘ ~ Bird l 
Payoff ———-； n " " " " ； “ 
Hawk Dove 
Hawk -2, -2 2’ 0 -p 
S Dove 0 ,2 1, 1 
31 Selfish agent refers to agent which is aims at maximizing the own profit, but not the collective profit. 
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For case 1)，two Hawks fight each other causing payoff of -2 each. For case 2)，the 
Dove flees with payoff 0 and then the Hawk obtains payoff of 2. For case 3)，two 
Dove share the payoff of 1 each. The model stated that there is equilibrium while the 
population ratio of Hawk is 1/3. 
Consider an aggressive livingagents as a "Hawk" and an adaptive S-agent as a 
"Dove". While there is a large population of "Hawk", they fight with each other 
yielding "all-lost" result. Then, the small population of "Dove" has a higher payoff. 
While there is a large population of "Dove", the small population of "Hawk" has high 
payoff since it always obtain desired items without any competition. 
5.2.3 Our agent model 
In this experiment, we want to test the effectiveness of our agent model and its 
mechanisms under varying population of aggressive and adaptive agents. We expect 
to see that our agent model and mechanisms work well in all cases. 
Experimental Setting 
We let our CUHK agent play against varying population of L-agents and S-agents. 
Initially, there are one L-agents and six S-agents. Afterwards, we replace one S-agent 
by another L-agents per 10 games. 
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Experimental Results 
Performance of CUHK 
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Figure 20: Performance of our CUHK agent under varying population of aggressive and adaptive 
agents 
No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of S-agents 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CUHK Average scores 3568.78 3325.34 2806.39 3091.39 2395.06 -92.74 
Average scores 3436.54 2659.34 2101.64 2390.58 1204.91 -4934.19 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 230.37 234.13 147.39 500.48 902.08 
Average scores 2830.58 2205.08 2165.66 2195.43 1816.95 441.49 
S-agent 
S.D. 274.12 948.04 972.33 636.19 533.63 N/A 
The CUHK agent performs well in all cases because our agent model contains both 
aggressive and adaptive characteristics. 
While there are many adaptive S-agents, the market favorites to agent with aggressive 
attribute. Since our CUHK agent uses the utility obtainable from a travel package as a 
budget for bidding goods inside that travel package, it bids more aggressively than 
adaptive S-agents. As a result, the CUHK agent becomes an aggressive agent in a 
non-competitive market. 
7 4 
When there are many aggressive agents, a market becomes unstable and favorites to 
adaptive agents. Since AAS reviews allocation continuously, the CUHK agent can 
respond to dynamic price changes. Although the CUHK agent has an aggressive 
bidding strategy for hotel reservations, it can change the allocation when target hotel 
reservations become expensive. As a result, the CUHK becomes an adaptive agent in 
competitive market. 
The CUHK agent significantly outperforms both L-agents and S-agents except two 
cases. First, the CUHK agent does not really outperform the only L-agents in a 
non-competitive market. It is because both of them have identical market advantage. 
Second, the only S-agent outperforms the CUHK agent in a competitive market. The 
CUHK agent can change allocation if and only if it can remove the commitments 
associated with its possibly winning items (see Chapter 4, Bid winning probability). 
Those commitments are removed only when other adaptive agents place bids on top 
of the bids associated with those possibly won items. When there is only one S-agent 
in a market, the number of adaptive agents is not sufficient to remove all 
commitments made. Hence, the CUHK agent cannot change its allocation effectively. 
Anyway, the CUHK agent still achieves good performance in those 2 cases. 
5.2.4 Historical clearing price 
We believe referencing historical clearing price for uncertain goods can effectively 
improve the agent performance. First, it acts as a measurement of competitors' 
aggressiveness. Although individual competitor's strategy is unknown, the collective 
behaviors can be somewhat observable from historical clearing prices. If all historical 
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clearing prices are skyrocketing, it is likely the clearing price of current market will 
become high too. Second, historical clearing prices reflect the outcome of an agent 
strategy. Assume that the collective behaviors of competitors do not change 
dramatically. The same strategy would result in consistent outcomes. 
Experimental Setting 
To investigate effects of historical clearing prices, an alternative version of CUHK is 
examined under varying population of L-agents and S-agents. 
- C U H K ( N f f l S T ) : The CUHK agent considers the current ASK as marginal 
costs; without considering historical clearing prices. 
Experimental Result 
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Figure 21: Performance of the CUHK agent without referencing historical clearing prices 
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No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of S-agents 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CUHK(NHIST) Average scores 3718.69 2787.80 3038.79 2096.18 -559.31 -1183.80 
Average scores 3761.36 2453.79 2745.84 842.18 -1945.80 -3450.04 
L-agent 
S.D. 211.86 327.87 197.52 825.83 242.45 866.12 
Average scores 2860.68 2536.35 2732.88 2090.70 1566.18 1398.80 
S-agent 
S.D. N/A 621.50 265.09 93.19 47.94 N/A 
It is shown that the performance of the CUHK is significantly decreased without 
referencing historical clearing prices. The effect is much clearer when there are more 
aggressive L-agents. In a competitive market, the clearing price can be skyrocketed 
and become far higher than the current ASK. Poor decisions are easily made without 
referencing any historical information. In a non-competitive market, prices are much 
predictable and hence the agent performance is not greatly affected. 
Comparisons among different approaches 
We use median of clearing prices in 10 most recently played games for representing 
outcomes of historical auctions. The idea is to filter the effects of abrupt clearing 
prices (skyrocketing or extremely low). We compare varying methods to show that 
using median is the most suitable approach. 
- CUHK(Median): Median of clearing prices is used (original) 
- CUHK(Mean): Mean of clearing prices is used 
- CUHK(Sampling): One random selected clearing price is used. 
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Figure 22: Comparisons between different approaches of referencing historical clearing prices 
The median approach is more stable in outperforming competitors except when there 
are many aggressive agents. The reason of exception is based on the extremes clearing 
prices in an unstable market. The clearing prices in an unstable market sometimes can 
are skyrocketed as 1000，but sometimes can also be extremely low as zero. 
Consider an example in TAC. Assume the clearing prices of TT3 in 10 most recently 
played games are 0，0’ 0，0，0，0’ 1000, 1000，1000 and 1000. It is not surprising that 
next auction possibly closes at 0 or 1000，based on recent occurrence statistic. The 
median approach predicts marginal cost as zero, which is far from another extreme 
1000. If the next auction closes at clearing price 1000，the penalty for inaccurate 
prediction becomes high. 
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5.2.5 Increasing marginal cost 
Since clearing prices are unknown in multi-unit ascending auction, there is 
uncertainty for bidding goods in this type of auction. We believe an agent can improve 
the performance if it considers marginal cost of uncertain goods is increasing. 
Experimental Setting 
To investigate the effectiveness of increasing marginal cost, an alternative version of 
CUHK is examined under varying population of L-agents and S-agents. 
- CUHK(NI): The CUHK agent considers marginal cost of goods is not 
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Figure 23: Performance of the CUHK agent without adopting increasing marginal costs 
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No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of S-agents 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CUHK(NI) Average scores 4017.41 3357.78 2630.11 1709.17 280.58 1278.59 
Average scores 3362.88 3112.06 2460.56 1169.56 -1625.72 -2830.11 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 224.23 196.43 534.00 288.60 486.60 
Average scores 2406.68 2222.06 1919.20 1971.31 575.84 1802.97 
S-agent 
S.D. 274.12 455.85 591.94 114.21 577.26 N/A 
The diagram shows that the performance of our CUHK agent has slightly decreased. 
The difference is clearer when there are more aggressive L-agents. Compared to 
historical clearing prices consideration, the effectiveness of increasing marginal cost 
is less significant. 
In a non-competitive stable market, clearing prices are more predictable and hence 
they are not far away from our prediction. As a result, penalty of inaccurate prediction 
is low even if an agent allocation heavily depends on a few kinds of goods. On the 
other hand, the penalty of inaccurate prediction becomes high in an unstable market. 
Suppose clearing prices are skyrocketed and become far higher than our prediction. 
An agent should pay all won goods items at skyrocketed clearing prices. Increasing 
marginal cost is successful in reducing the penalty of inaccurate prediction because it 
guides an agent to bid fewer and distributed goods. 
During the agent development, we placed both CUHK and CUHK(NI) in the official 
TAC servers to compete with other participants. From game 3780 - 3823 in server 
“tac.sics.se，，，the CUHK and CUHK(NI) agents obtained an averaged score 2776.46 
and 2457.06 respectively. The CUHK score is 300 ahead of the CUHK(NI). The result 
was consistent with our result under a controlled environment. 
80 
I 
5.2.6 Bid winning probability 
In multi-unit ascending auction, an agent should acquire its won items at clearing 
price. It is known as commitment. We believe an agent can perform better by 
considering bid winning probability (see Chapter 4，Bid winning probability). At a 
particular time, some commitments are already fixed and removable. If an agent 
"surely" wins those items, they should be considered as sunk costs. 
Experimental Setting 
To investigate the effectiveness of bid winning probability consideration, an 
alternative version of CUHK is examined under varying population of L-agents and 
S-agents. 
- CUHK(CR): The CUHK agent assumes all commitments of its possibly 
winning items are removable. 
Experimental Result 
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Figure 24: Performance of the CUHK agent without considering bid winning probability 
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No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of S-agents 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CUHK(CR) Average scores 2969.22 3210.99 2591.88 2320.78 1289.35 1289.68 
Average scores 3339.66 3196.00 2365.36 1743.86 -1019.93 -2298.99 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 71.38 157.01 71.36 235.08 902.08 
Average scores 2961.06 2686.34 2369.59 2277.71 1708.70 1398.44 
S-agent 
S.D. 115.88 360.58 310.21 381.27 169.28 N/A 
Our result shows that the performance of CUHK is decreased without considering bid 
winning probability. It is because the CUHK(CR) agent is too optimistic such that it 
bid duplicate goods. 
Consider an example. Suppose a client requires a hotel reservation at day 3 for his/her 
travel package. Initially, the CUHK(CR) agent allocates a hotel reservation SS3 to 
that client because SS3 is predicted to be cheaper than TT3. After several cycles, the 
predicted marginal cost of SS3 becomes higher than that of TT3. Hence, the 
CUHK(CR) agent switches to bid hotel reservation TT3 for that client. Unfortunately, 
the commitment associated with SS3 hotel reservation is not removable. Thus, The 
CUHK(CR) needs to pay for that SS3 hotel reservation. The CUHK(CR) agent ends 
up with 2 duplicate hotel reservations, SS3 and TT3. 
5.2.7 FL-strategy 
The FL-strategy uses fuzzy rules and fuzzy reasoning mechanism to decide the best 
ask and bid in continuous double auction (CDA). To examine the effectiveness of the 
FL-strategy, we compare this performance with another "A-strategy". 
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A-strategy 
The A-strategy is inspired by the bidding strategy of ATTac used for CDA. The 
identical strategy was used in both TAC '00 and TAC '01 (Stone el al., 2001; Stone et 
al., 2002). We believe A-strategy is a good reference for comparison. First, ATTac 
achieved excellent results in both TAC '00 and TAC ’01. Second, there were other 
TAC entries using likewise bidding strategies (He & Jennings，2002). In A-strategy, 
the initial ask is high and the initial bid is low^^. Afterwards, the A-strategy steadily 
decreases the ask (increases the bid) when bundles are almost completed. 
The A-strategy sells entertainment tickets only if it is more profitable than allocates 
them to clients. Assume ticket E is allocated to a client with fun bonus V(E). Then, 
A-strategy sells the ticket at min(200, V(E) + a) where a decreases linearly from 80 to 
20 in TAC. In other words, the minimum profit is 20 for selling an allocated ticket. 
For an unallocated ticket E, the A-strategy sells the ticket at A decrease linearly from 
100 to 50 in TAC. The reservation price of 50 prevents to benefit competitors too 
much. The agent acquires an additional ticket only if the utility obtainable is higher 
than the cost. For an acquiring ticket E, assume that the fun bonus obtainable of E is 
V(E). The A-strategy acquires the ticket at max(0, V(E) — o) where a increases 
linearly from 20 to 80. In other words, the minimum profit is 20 for acquiring an 
additional ticket. 
32 Remember that ask refers to selling price offered for an item of goods, while bid refers to buying 
price offered for an item of goods (see Definition) 
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Figure 25: The A-strategy, which is aspired by ATTac，s bidding strategy for CD A 
The A-strategy is based on an idea that the uncertainty of completing bundles is 
decreasing. Thus, the initial ask and bid should be as optimistic as possible. An agent 
can accept ask or bid with less profit when bundles are almost completed. 
Experimental Setting 
We compare the performance of alternative versions of CUHK agents using 
FL-strategy and A-strategy under varying population of L-agents and S-agents. 
- CUHK(FL): The CUHK agent using FL-strategy for CDA 
- C U H K ( A ) : The CUHK agent using A-strategy for CDA 
In the experiment, the S-agent is extended to trade entertainment tickets at current 
prices. In other words, S-agent buys tickets at ASK+1 and sells tickets at BID-1. The 
livingagents always trades entertainment tickets at fixed prices. It buys tickets at 60 
and sells tickets at 120. 
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Experimental Result 
Performance of CUHK(FL) Performance of CUHK(A) 
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Figure 26: Comparisons between the performance of FL-strategy and A-strategy 
No. of L-agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of S-agents 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CUHK(FL) Average scores 3935.72 4375.47 3598.15 2793.37 2453.89 863.59 
Average scores 3844.74 4063.79 2770.72 1087.62 230.15 -2219.12 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 23.41 282.09 376.22 804.69 487.81 
Average scores 2949.27 3337.50 2579.02 2358.49 1741.41 2385.51 
S-agent 
S.D. 432.65 102.84 286.42 445.79 278.06 N/A 
CUHK(A) Average scores 3856.33 3657.93 3896.77 2522.06 1987.71 2118.03 
Average scores 3961.51 3564.90 3354.76 1999.30 -345.66 -1159.31 
L-agent 
S.D. N/A 127.97 217.97 257.80 301.57 748.73 
Average scores 3148.95 2881.08 3077.76 2022.18 2319.01 2648.14 
S-agent 
S.D. 168.99 411.98 142.22 160.14 113.50 N/A 
From the diagram, it is shown that FL-strategy is more stable in outperforming the 
competitors. The major reason is the adaptive behavior of FL-strategy. The 
FL-strategy adjusts this risk attributes based on recent transactions. Effectively the 
agent has more transactions than L-agents because it provides lower asks for buyer 
and higher bids for seller. On the other hand, the agent's transactions are more 
profitable than that of S-agents. An agent with FL-strategy is willing to take more risk 
for higher profit when the market demand is high. 
85 
There is an exceptional case when all competitors are L-agents. Unlike A-strategy, the 
FL-strategy does not have a pre-set minimum profit. The FL-strategy continuously 
adjusts risk attributes when there is no recent transaction. Finally an agent buys 
expensive tickets from L-agents and sells cheap tickets to L-agents. Thus, it benefits 
to L-agents. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion and 
Future work 
We achieved several contributions in this thesis. First, we proposed a generic agent 
model using a divide-and-conquer approach. The performance of the model is 
examined under both TAC '02 tournament and our controlled testing environment. 
The experimental result showed that our model performed well in all competitive and 
non-competitive markets. Although the model adopted several previously published 
works, the innovation is to indicate appropriate methods and combine them in an 
effective way. 
Second, we proposed a set of mechanisms to tackle divided sub-problems. The 
mechanisms include referencing historical clearing prices, increasing marginal costs 
for uncertain goods, considering bid winning probabilities and adopting fuzzy logic 
bidding in continuous double auctions. The effectiveness of each mechanism was 
examined in the TAC benchmark problem under a controlled environment. The 
mechanisms described in this thesis may be tailor-made for auction protocols in TAC. 
However, those mechanisms demonstrated the key underlying principles we adopted 
in bidding, cost prediction and allocation. Additional mechanisms for other auction 
protocols can be formulated using principles like budget bidding, marginal cost, sunk 
cost, opportunity cost and so on. 
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Third, this thesis studied interactions of aggressive and adaptive agents. The study of 
agents' interactions was motivated from tournament result in TAC ’01: an open-loop, 
aggressively bidding "livingagents" obtained the highest scores among all agents in 
final round. Since most opponents changed their target goods to avoid bidding war, 
"livingagents" won all its desired goods without strong competition. We conducted a 
series of experiments to investigate how such interactions may determine their 
performance. The experimental results showed that a market exhibits properties 
similar to the Hawk-Dove Game, in which the minority has an advantage. 
In conclusion, this thesis investigated how an agent can bid and bundle goods for 
multiple clients effectively from online auctions. The problem is interesting and 
complicated: clients' preferences are over bundles but goods inside a bundle are 
traded in various auction protocols. Moreover, there is no best strategy for all possible 
cases since agents with various strategies are interacting. The traditional auction 
theory is not applicable for the problem because it focused on single item and single 
auction protocol. To verify feasibility of our proposed agent model, a functioning 
agent called "CUHK" was developed and participated in TAC '02 tournament. The 
agent was successful in winning high positions in all tournament rounds. The 
tournament result is a good indicator of our agent model's effectiveness. The 
considerable efforts put in designing, development and fine-tuning are our key 
success factors. The experiments in this thesis are conducted in relative small-scale 
market of eight trading agents. The market size of eight agents is the standard of 
TAC '02 tournament. The software package downloadable in TAC '02 page is 
specified for the tournament standard as well. Although we may develop our own 
auction server with larger market scale, it is impractical for us to fully implement 
other agents from all world-leading groups. Hence, analysis and comparisons draw 
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from TAC '02 tournament results are all in this market size. We propose experiments 
in larger-scale markets (e.g. stock market) are more suitable for future work. 
The study in this thesis can be further extended in several directions. One valuable 
future work is to investigate how our agent model and mechanisms can be applied 
into other similar application domains. In TAC ’03’ the game scenario will change to 
a supply chain market problem. Participating agents will need to compete for client 
orders and acquire components from suppliers simultaneously. The game scenario is a 
general to represent many other supply chain markets: agents are required to 
concurrently involve in multiple markets of interacting goods, store up inventory with 
unreliable supply goods and estimate customers' demands. The supply chain market 
contains challenges similar to those we studied in this thesis: multiple market 
mechanisms, interacting goods, various opponents' strategies, and more. Hence, we 
believe our agent model is also applicable to supply chain market scenarios. Stock 
market is yet another interesting application domain similar to the market scenario we 
studied in this thesis. The stock market mechanisms are alike but more complicated to 
that of Continuous Double Auction. Investors can hold various kinds of stocks at the 
same time to balance risk and profit. Some investors are risk seeking while others are 
risk averse. Thus, the stock market application domain also involves problems of 
interacting goods, simultaneous markets and opponents' strategies. The TAC has 
features common to many real-life problems. We believed our generic agent model 
and mechanisms are applicable for a wide range of similar real-life problems. 
Another future direction is to investigate the possibility of extending our agent model 
for sequential auctions and combinatorial auctions. In this thesis, we assumed goods 
are traded separately in simultaneous auctions. “Sequential auctions” is an auction 
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protocol where auctions are running in rounds. In other words, a new auction will not 
start before the current auction close. “Combinatorial auctions" is another auction 
protocol where goods are traded in bundles instead of single item. We believe both 
auction protocols are worthy to be studied because they are common for trading 
bundles of goods. 
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